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Abstract

Sex offender commitment laws present courts with a difficult choice: either allow creative efforts to prevent
sexual violence or enforce traditional constitutional safeguards constraining the power of the state to deprive
citizens of their Iiberty. Three state supreme courts have deflected this hard choice while upholding sex
offender commitment schemes. As part of their ""official narrative"" that legitimizes sex offender
commitments, the courts claim that society can have prevention and still maintain the primacy of the criminal
justice system. This narrative neutralizes the conflict in values by claiming that sex offender commitments are
just like mental illness commitments, a small, discrete area of the law unprotected by the safeguards of
criminal procedure. This article shows the dissolution of the values reconciliation in these official narratives
when courts confront concrete cases and the intense public pressure to lock up sex criminals. Part I of this
article explains that sex offender commitments need to be legitimized because they appear to encroach on
fundamental American legal values. Part II describes the official narrative that three state supreme courts have
developed to justify sex offender commitments. Part III of the article examines the violent public and political
reaction to one attempt to implement the legal limitations actually contained in, but never before followed, in
Minnesota's official narrative. Part IV uses the corpus of sex offender commitment cases in Minnesota to show
that the official narrative is reduced to a ""legal fiction"" when the lower courts confront actual cases where the
conflict in values must be concretely resolved. Part V argues that the clashing values are too important to be
resolved with a false reconciliation. It recommends that courts reviewing sex offender commitment schemes
understand how they are actually administered in concrete cases and concludes that the official narrative of
sex offender commitments is, to a material degree, fiction.
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·Sex Offender Commitments:
Debunking the Official Narrative
and Revealing the Rules-in-Use
by

Eric S. Janus
Blossoming
during
the
heyday of psychiatric "fix
everything" optimism, the idea of
committing sex offenders to
mental hospitals to be "cured"
appeared to have failed and died
by the 1980s.1 But reports of its
demise were premature.
Like
cicadas, insects that lie dormant for
years
between
plague-like
onslaughts, civil commitment for
"mentally
disordered"
sex
offenders is back. It has returned
in a more robust, and potentially
more dangerous, form. Whereas
the main thrust of the first
generation
sex
offender
commitment statutes was to divert
certain sex offenders from prisons
to hospitals in order to treat in a
humane manner those too sick to
deserve punishment,2 the second

generation statutes assert the right
to use civil incarceration after and
in
addition
to
criminal
punishmenf to contain those who
are "too dangerous" to be released
from prison. 4
These second generation
lawss are rooted in the legitimate
governmental
interest
in
preventing sexual violence.. They
claim to be civil rather than
criminal, regulatory rather than
punitive. 6 Thus, these statutes
claim to be exempt from key
constraints imposed by the
constitution on criminal law
interventions,
such
as
the
prohibitions
against
double
jeopardy? and ex post facto laws,S
the right to a trial by jury,9 and the
right to insist upon the highest
standard of proof. 1o Furthermore,
they appear to contravene the
prohibitions against criminalizing
a status 11 as well as those against basing criminal
conviction on predicted, rather than committed, crimes. 12
This claim of exemption is not an incidental aspect
of sex offender commitment schemes, but rather the very
basis courts use to legitimize their existence. These laws
have developed, often in the white light of intense media
and political activity, to deal with the impediments
created by criminal constitutional protections. 13 The
explicit purpose of sex offender commitment laws is to
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prevent the release of sex offenders from prison when
they have completed their prison sentences.
Thus, these laws place two important objectives in
conflict: preventing sexual violence and protecting basic
constitutional rights. Powerful stories of sexual violence,
told and re-told, create a legitimate and long-overdue
mandate to prevent sexual violence. 14 In conflict are the
'''great safeguards which the law adopts [to protect
individuals] in the punishment of crime and the upholding
of justice. ",IS The prevention mandate seeks to avoid
these very safeguards.
Sex offender commitment laws present courts with a
difficult choice: either allow creative efforts to prevent
sexual violence or enforce traditional constitutional
safeguards constraining the power of the state to deprive
citizens of their Iiberty.16 Three state supreme courts have
deflected this hard choice while upholding sex offender
commitment schemes. 17
As part of their "official
narrative" that legitimizes sex offender commitments, the
courts claim that society can have prevention and still
maintain the primacy of the criminal justice system. This
narrative neutralizes the conflict in values by claiming
that sex offender commitments are just like mental illness
commitments, a small, discrete area of the law
unprotected by the safeguards of criminal procedure.
This article shows the dissolution of the valuesreconciliation in these official narratives when courts
confront concrete cases and the intense public pressure to
lock up sex criminals.
Part I of this article explains that sex offender
commitments need to be legitimized because they appear
to encroach on fundamental American legal values. Part
II describes the official narrative that three state supreme
courts have developed to justify sex offender
commitments. Part III of the article examines the violent
public and political reaction to one attempt to implement
the legal limitations actually contained in, but never
before followed, in Minnesota's official narrative. Part
IV uses the corpus of sex offender commitment cases in
Minnesota to show that the official narrative is reduced to
a "legal fiction" when the lower courts confront actual
cases where the conflict in values must be concretely
resolved. 18 Part V argues that the clashing values are too
important to be resolved with a false reconciliation. It
recommends that courts reviewing sex offender
commitment schemes understand how they are actually
administered in concrete cases and concludes that the
official narrative of sex offender commitments is, to a
material degree, fiction.
I.

72

THE NEED FOR LEGITIMIZATION OF SEX
OFFENDER COMMITMENTS
Sex offender commitment!) push the boundaries of

standard civil commitment. 19
They use preventive
detention to accomplish purposes that hitherto have been
reserved exclusively for criminal law. Contemporary sex
offender commitment laws are, by statutory definition,
designed to prevent "crimes."20
The fundamental constitutional legitimacy of
standard civil commitment laws has been, for the most
part, assumed rather than proven. 21 But sex offender
cOmniitment laws are different.
The questionable
constitutionality of their inadequately defined limits
In
demands special justification or legitimization.
contrast to years of jurisprudential silence on the
substantive limits of standard civil commitment,22 the
advent of second generation sex offender commitment
laws has spawned a spate of cases directly addressing the
perimeters of their constitutionality.23
Sex offender commitment schemes were enacted
precisely because standard civil commitment laws were
not broad enough to cover sex offenders. 24 The targets of
sex offender commitments do not appear to be "crazy" or
"mentally ill," at least not in the sense traditionally
required for standard civil commitment. 2s Furthermore,
the societal motivations for sex offender commitments
appear to differ from those underlying standard civil
commitments.
For instance, many standard civil
commitments are based on the parens patriae power of the
state and thus have a rather benign flavor to them: people
who are too ill to make their own decisions, and whose
illnesses are so serious as to be potentially harmful, are
protected by society from themselves and often given
significantly therapeutic services.26 The other key use of
civil commitment has been to protect the public from
dangerous individuals, a use based on the police power of
the state. This use has been explicitly approved in a
series of cases decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. 27 The
most obvious context for these cases has been the use of
civil commitment to incarcerate insanity acquitees-those
whose mental illness was so severe as to render them nonresponsible for crimes they had committed--as well as
those deemed incompetent to stand tria1. 28
Sex offender commitments depart from these
paradigms. They do not arise out of a benign, parens
patriae, motive. 29
The subjects of sex offender
commitments are not incompetent to make decisions
about their own mental health treatment. 30 And they have
not been found incompetent to stand trial or not guilty by
reason of insanity. 31
Sex offender commitments possess many of the
qualities that elicit condemnation of
"preventive
detention.'>32
Most centrally, unlike standard civil
commitments, sex offender commitments are aimed
directly at those guilty of criminal acts,33 and are
explicitly intended to circumvent the traditional strict
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constitutional limitations on the state's power to
incarcerate.34 In addition, though courts may categorize
them as "civil commitment as usual,'~. sex offender
commitments are well outside the traditional boundaries
for standard civil commitment. For these reasons, sex
offender commitment schemes need special justification
or legitimization.
II.

THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVES AND
ESPOUSED RULES OF SEX OFFENDER
COMMITMENTS AS ILLUSTRATED BY
THREE STATE SUPREME COURT
DECISIONS
Sex offender commitment laws are the
crystallization of a particular set of stories about sexual
violence.3s Some of these stories, or narratives, are
"private;" they are the stories of individuals who have
been victimized by sex offenders and the stories of sex
offenders whose lives have been caught in the web of
these new laws.36 Some of the narratives have become
public. These are the narratives that come to represent
the reasons for having a law, or its effects, or its legal and
ethical issues, or its justifications. Of these public stories,
some have been officially adopted, by legislatures or by
courts, to explain and justify the laws. These narratives
are the "official narratives" of the sex offender
commitment laws.37
The stories evolve as they move from the realm of
the news media and the legislature to the appellate
courtroom. While the most salient stories in the early
stages of the development of sex offender commitment
laws were stories of sexual violence and pain,l8 the
official narrative contains other strands. These seek to
reassure the legal community and the broader public that
this form of preventive detention is legitimate and that the
adoption of sex offender commitment laws does not mean
a retreat from the fundamental constitutional protections
of the criminal law. 39
Inherent in the notion of an "official narrative" is a
claim to be telling the truth. In the sex offender
commitment context, the official narrative concerns a
legal proceeding governed by law. Thus, the official
narrative implies the existence of a set of rules that
translate the official narrative into courtroom practices. I
will call these the "espoused rules" of sex offender
commitments. These are the rules that the courts claim to
be applying.40
The rules the courts actually use to decide sex
offender commitment cases--the "rules-in-use"- reflect
the real patterns of decisions and may be quite different
from the espoused rules. These departures may be
intentional or entirely unconscious.41 To the extent that
the rules-in-use depart materially and consistently from

the official narrative and the espoused rules, the official
narrative becomes fiction, not truth.42 It is fiction in the
sense that the courts tell one story and act another. The
true nature of sex offender commitments, reflected in the
rules-in-use, remains invisible and untold.43
As with any narrative, the most important points
may be made through subtle hints that evoke a particular
set of themes or emotions. The most powerful point of
the story may, indeed, be a counterpoint to the explicit
subject matter of the story.
In the sex offender
commitment context, the official narrative hews to such a
theme, deftly expressed as an ethos or emotional tone to
the stories. It is communicated as much by the manner in
which the courts tell the story of the legitimacy of sex
offender commitments as by the explicit terms of the
story itself.
Supreme courts in three states have upheld sex
offender commitment laws: Washington,44 Minnesota,45
and Wisconsin.46 The narratives spun by these courts are
deceptively simple. They intend to comfort their readers
by reframing the potentially frightening story of
unprincipled "psychiatric" preventive detention47 into a
familiar and safe story: Sex offender commitments are
really nothing more than the ubiquitous and limited
standard civil commitment. But this simple story is not
persuasive. At key points in each of their narratives, the
three courts -invoke the "principle of criminal
interstitiality,,48 to dispel doubts that sex offender
commitment laws are truly legitimate.
A. MENTAL DISORDER, NOT VIOLENCE, IS THE LEAD
CHARACTER OF THE NARRATIVE

The narratives spun by each of these courts in
justifying sex offender commitments contain the same
elements. Each of the narratives begins with the stories of
sexual violence that have generated sex offender
commitment laws.49 Each of the courts identifies the past
crimes committed by the defendants and the predictions
that sexual violence is highly likely to recur. so Each court
identifies the state interest in protecting citizens against
this violence, and each characterizes this interest as a
"compelling" state interest.SI
Thus far, the narrative is not new. It is the same
story that led to the enactment of these laws. But here the
official narrative introduces a new theme:
mental
disorder. Rhetorically and legally, it seems, the story of
violence and protective response is no longer persuasive.
It is not immediately clear why this should be so.
The story of violence sufficed to persuade legislators that
creative approaches to prevention were warranted.
Legally, due process simply requires that the state
narrowly tailor its actions to meet a compelling state
interest, a characterization clearly applicable to focused
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protections against sexual violence. 52
Why do the
supreme courts' narratives need to add mental disorder as
a significant element of the story to legitimize sex
offender commitments? All three courts assume, with
varying degrees of explicitness, that dangerousness
"alone" is insufficient to justify preventive detention. 53
The role of "mental disorder" in the narrative is to offer
assurances that the use of preventive detention in sex
offender commitments is "safely" circumscribed.
Note that the courts could have assigned this
boundary-setting role to the "violence" element of the
stories. The limitation on the use of preventive detention
could have been accomplished by restricting sex offender
commitments to the "most dangerous" sex criminals. 54
The fact that "mental disorder" was chosen over violence
for this role increases the dramatic tension to discover
how "mental disorder" legitimizes sex offender
commitments.
The "mental disorder" element must accomplish two
tasks. First, it must offer reassurance that th~ use of
preventive detention for sex offenders is principled and
does not represent an uncontrolled breach in the hitherto
high wall around the use of preventive detention. 55
Robert F. Schopp and Barbara J. Sturgis describe this as
the discriminative role for mental disorder. 56 Second, it
must explain why the preventive detention of sex
offenders is justified. 57
Without explicitly saying so, all three courts engage
in this analysis. The courts begin with a mechanical
argument by analogy. Sex offender commitments are
''just like" standard civil commitments. 58 Both forms of
civil commitment ("standard" and sex offender) are based
on a simple three-part formula: past acts plus mental
disorder plus predicted future harm. 59 Though most
standard civil commitment statutes require a form of
"mental illness," and the sex offender commitment
statutes require a showing of "psychopathic personality,,60
or "mental abnormalities" or "mental disorder" or
"personality disorder,"6! these differences are initially
dismissed by the courts as mere semantics. The U.S.
Supreme Court, they accurately observe, has used a
variety of terms to describe the mental status predicate to
civil commitment. 62 One form of "mental condition" is
just as good as another for legitimizing sex offender
commitments.
B.

GENERAL ASSURANCES ABOUT "MENTAL
DISORDER"

This simple analogy is unpersuasive.
New
commitment laws were needed for sex offenders precisely
because the mental disorders of sex offenders fell outside
of those cognizable in standard civil commitment cases. 63
An analogy asserts that two things are so similar that the

74

known qualities of the first can be attributed to the
second. All analogies express an implicit judgment about
which aspects of the two things are significant. If the
ways in which the things are alike are significant, then the
analogy works. 64 Thus, the narrative must demonstrate
that despite the differences, the mental disorders in sex
offender commitment provide a basis for limiting
preventive detention and for justifying its use that is as
"real" as that which delineates the mental illnesses of
standard civil commitments.
Further, the attempt to extend the coverage of civil
commitment by expanding the term "mental disorder"
triggers an underlying skepticism in American culture
about the basic validity of psychiatry and its potential for
manipUlation and misuse.~5 To be persuasive, the story
about the mental disorder element has to neutralize the
charge that psychiatric categories are manipulable and
unreliable. 66 Thus, each of the courts attempts to establish
that the mental disorder element is a defmite and limited
one.67
Neither of these assurances is particularly
convmcmg. The courts, for example, cannot seem to
decide what significance to give the medical definitions
of "mental disorder." At times they claim the term
"mental disorder" is a legal, not a medical one, but at
times they cite medical authority.68 The Wisconsin
court's explanation merely replaces one rather opaque
concept, "disorder," with several others: "normality,"
"pathology," and "clinically significant.,,69
The
Minnesota court characterizes its statute as requiring a
"volitional dysfunction" which it suggests, without
authority, is somehow comparable to the standard civil
commitment definition of "mental iIIness."7o But the
court offers no explanation for what a "volitional
dysfunction" is,7! and seems to throw up its hands at the
complexity of the subject and simply assert its
conclusion: "Whatever the explanation or label, the
'psychopathic personality' is an identifiable and
documentable violent sexually deviant condition or
disorder.'>12 The Washington Supreme Court argues that
the "reality" of "personality disorders" is attested to by its
inclusion in the official nomenclature of the American
Psychiatric Association, and that the reality of "mental
abnormality," which is not included, can be ascertained
from the "good faith" testimony of mental health
professionals.73
These discussions should be viewed critically, with
some measure of skepticism. There is a large and
sophisticated body of literature on the issues surrounding
the "reality" of various mental disorders,74 and none of
the courts cite this literature or give the faintest
acknowledgment of the density or complexity of the
issues. The point of this article, however, is not to
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critique the official narrative generated by the courts, but
rather to understand it and articulate its rhetorical
structure.
These discussions must be seen as
acknowledgments by the courts of the need for a
principled and usable limitation on preventive detention.
The courts' narrative endorses the proposition that
"mental disorder" must perform a discriminative role7s if
sex offender commitments are to be legitimate.76
Even if the courts' attempts to establish the "reality"
of the mental disorder elements were sound, the
fundamental analogy would still be unpersuasive. Merely
knowing that sex offender commitment statutes
discriminate based on a "real condition" is insufficient to
provide a justification for the discrimination. 77 That is,
the narrative needs to explain why the State may use
preventive detention against a sexual offender with a
"mental disorder" while it could not use the same
technique against a person without such a "disorder."

c.

"CRIMINAL INTERSTITIALITY" AS THE KEY
LEGITIMIZING PRINCIPLE

The official narrative for sex offender commitments
invokes a particular legitimizing principle, which this
article will refer to as "criminal interstitiality." Simply
put, criminal interstitiality ensures legitimacy by
maintaining the primacy and ubiquity of the criminal
justice system. The boundaries of civil (non-criminal)
confinement are defined in terms of the boundaries of the
criminal justice system. Civil commitment is permitted to
reach only where the criminal justice system cannot
reach.78 Under this principle, civil commitment is
interstitial to the criminal law in two senses: criminal law
is the primary and ubiquitous system for addressing
public health and safety issues through the deprivation of
liberty. Criminal law remains primary in the sense that it
is first in line to be used and is by-passed only when its
inherent substantive limitations prevent its operation. It
remains ubiquitous in the sense that the "secondary"
systems take up only a small--and wellbounded--fraction of the work. 79 Thus, the principle of
criminal interstitiality permits criminal law to remain the
primary tool for the State to curtail liberty as a means of
controlling antisocial, violent behavior, while legitimizing
sex offender cOqImitments in defined circumstances
beyond the limits of criminal law.
There are deeply entrenched and socially approved
boundaries for our criminal law. so The criminal law
maintains a sense of moral s1 (and constitutional) force in
our society for two reasons. First, it imposes the ultimate
interventions (deprivation of liberty and life) only under
stringent procedural conditions.
This fundamental
compact--stringent rules for ultimate sanctions-is
threatened to the extent the State can utilize the same

interventions (deprivation of liberty) without abiding by
the same stringent limitations. Second, criminal law
addresses only "actions" for which persons are
"responsible" because they have a non-excused criminal
intent.S2 Behaviors that fall outside of these categories are
not proper subjects for criminal sanctions. s3
Thus, there are two types of human behaviors that
are beyond the reach of criminal law. Some behaviors
cannot be subject to its reach because of the operation of
stringent procedural rules. Others are beyond its reach
because of the operation of "substantive" rules about
"actions" and "responsibility." For simplicity here, this
article will refer to the latter, substantive category as the
mental state rules of the criminal law. The principle of
interstitiality holds that the state may use the civil system
of incapacitation to protect itself, but only against
behavior that it is otherwise incapable of reaching
because of the inherent limitations imposed by the
substantive mental state rules of the criminal law .
The principle of interstitiality preserves the moral
force of the criminal law because it retains the basic
compact underlying the criminal law: stringent procedural
safeguards for ultimate interventions. It does not permit
lesser procedural protections merely because the stringent
protections have some bite and occasionally result in
unpopular outcomes. But it does allow the State to use an
alternative system when the criminal law is substantively
disabled from addressing the harm posed by a potentially
dangerous individual.S4
The principle of interstitiality, if adopted as a
limiting principle for civil commitment, is strongly
legitimizing.ss It has a solid scholarly pedigree. 86 It puts
a categorical cap on preventive detention, providing a
principled boundary which ensures that preventive
detention will not swallow the criminal justice system.
Finally, the principle of criminal interstitiality serves to
situate the concept of "mental disorder" within the
legitimizing narratives, thus providing solid grounding for
the analogies of the courts.
Of course, the principle of interstitiality has a cost.
The principle limits the reach of sex offender
commitments to those persons whose mental disorders
render them inappropriate for prosecution. This result is
sharply at odds with the narratives that gave birth to the
sex offender commitment statutes, whose main theme
included the need to address predicted crimes by persons
who had been, and would continue to be, fully amenable
to criminal prosecution. As a result, the courts are
reluctant to embrace the principle of criminal
interstitiality explicitly. Instead, they evoke its theme by
indirect allusion. One of the benefits of the rhetorical
techniques of analogy and evocation is that the narrative
of legitimization need not squarely resolve this apparent
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conflict.
D.

THE EVOCATION OF INTERSTITIALITY

The article now examines how tl).e principle of
interstitiality is expressed in the narratives of the three
state supreme court decisions. It begins with Minnesota,
since that court's treatment of the subject is the most
direct. Minnesota's sex offender commitment law was
enacted in 1939 and has survived unrepealed, though it
was recently supplemented. 87
The original statute
authorized the civil commitment of persons with
"psychopathic personalities." In State ex rei. Pearson v.
Probate Court,88 the statute was challenged on the
ground that it was "so indefinite and uncertain as to make
it void."89 The court found the statute to be "imperfectly
drawn,,,90 and narrowed its application so that it would be
"in conformity . . . with the provisions of the
constitution.,,91 So narrowed, the statute was held to
apply only to persons who "have evidenced an utter lack
of power to control their sexual impulses and who as a
result are likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury, loss,
pain, or other evil on the objects of their uncontrolled and
uncontrollable desire.'>92 In 1994, when the Minnesota
Supreme Court was again called on to pass on the
constitutionality of this statute in In re Blodgett, it
reaffirmed the vitality of the Pearson "utter lack of power
to control" test, calling the condition a "volitional
dysfunction which grossly impairs judgment and behavior
with respect to the sex drive."93
These formulations rely on the principle of
interstitiality to justify sex offender commitments, but
they do so by evocation, rather than straightforward
articulation. The language and concepts used by the
court-"utter lack of power to control" and "volitional
dysfunction"---recall the volitional prong of criminal law
mental state defenses. 94 More than fifty years earlier, the
court noted that the statute specified that such problems
of control did not constitute an excuse from crime:
The act before us, in providing for the care and
commitment of persons having uncontrollable
and insane impulses to commit sexual offenses,
treats them as insane. While the public welfare
requires that they be treated before they have
opportunity to injure others, it does not
necessarily follow that their malady must
excuse them from criminal conduct occurring
in the past. 9S
In 1994, the Blodgett court did not characterize the
"utter lack of power to control" test as a criminal excuse
test either. But the court's 1994 pronouncements are
highly ambiguous, especially when considered in their

76

historical context.
In 1972, the Minnesota Supreme
Court held that the exclusion of volitional dysfunction
from the insanity defense was of doubtful
constitutionality:
By the very nature of criminal law and the
nature of our statute, volition is an element
which almost necessarily must be considered if
the statutory defense is to have any substance
when applied to many cases, and certainly to
this one. This is so because if, as in this case, a
defendant might realize in a general way that it
is illegal to strike a blow with a knife, but if he
did not know that the act was ethically wrong,

if he did not ''freely and deliberately" choose
to commit the act, and if he did not have the
will to prevent the act, there is missing an
ingredient that has almost universally been
considered essential before a crime can be
committed. As indicated above, a basic
postulate of our criminal law is a free agent
confronted with the choice between doing right
and doing wrong and choosing freely to do the
wrong. 96
Thus, by adopting a volitional dysfunction test for
sex offender commitments in 1994, the court was at least
indirectly invoking its 1972 ruling. More to the point, the
1994 court seems to suggest that individuals would be
assigned to prisons or hospitals depending on the extent
to which "criminal blame" could be assigned to them:
"For the legislature which must provide the necessary
prison cells or hospital beds, there are no easy answers.
Nor are there easy answers for society which, ultimately,
must decide to what extent criminal blame is to be
assigned to people who are what they are."97 In the
penultimate paragraph of the opinion, the court asserts
that the "moral credibility of the criminal justice system .
.. is at stake.,,98 The court supports this assertion with a
quote from Professor Paul H. Robinson: "[I]t would be
better to expand civil commitment to include seriously
dangerous offenders who are excluded from criminal
liability as blameless for any reason, than to divert the
criminal justice system from its traditional requirement of
moral blame."99 Put simply, criminal punishment is for
those who are blameworthy, and civil commitment for
those who are not. This is, of course, the principle of
criminal interstitiality.
But the court's parting shot in the opinion left
unclear the significance of this discussion: "In the present
imperfect state of scientific knowledge, where there are
no definitive answers, it would seem a state legislature
should be allowed, constitutionally, to choose either or
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both alternatives for dealing with the sexual predator."loo
Did the court mean that the legislature could deal with a
particular "sexual predator" in both systems? Or, was the
court suggesting that, collectively, the group of sexual
predators could be dealt with in either system, as
individual circumstances dictated?
The facts of the cases are ambiguous, and this
prevents a defmite conclusion about the significance of
the "utter lack of power to control" test. The 1939
Pearson case lOI reported no facts about the individual to
be committed, so there is no way to tell whether he was
(or could have been) held criminally responsible for his
actions. The individual in the 1994 case, Blodgett, had
been prosecuted and convicted for his crimes and had
served his sentence. These facts suggest quite strongly
that the "utter lack of power to control" test is not a test of
criminal responsibility. However, the court carefully
crafted the question presented so that it could avoid
deciding just that point. "Blodgett then petitioned this
court for further review, raising, however, only the
constitutional challenge. In other words, Blodgett does
not challenge here the fmdings that he has an
uncontrollable sexual impulse dangerous to others."102
Thus, in the court's view, Blodgett did not contest the
applicability of the "utter lack of power to control"
standard to himself. The court eschewed the opportunity
to determine whether or under what circumstances the test
would be properly met by an individual who had been
held responsible for his crimes. 103 Thus, a close reading
of Blodgett reveals that the court spoke distinctly of the
principle of criminal interstitiality, even though it
carefully insulated the holding from the inconvenient fact
that Blodgett had been held responsible for his actions
and that his criminal responsibility had never been
questioned.
The official story told by the Minnesota Supreme
Court, then, uses the language of criminal excuse, thereby
evoking the principle of criminal interstitiality. But it
does so in an incomplete and somewhat ambivalent way.
The court never says that sex offender commitments must
be interstitial to the criminal justice system, but its
reliance on the "utter lack of power to control" test
indicates that the court is operating according to this
assumption. Thus, Robert Schopp recognizes that the
Minnesota court's "utter lack of power to control"
construction "is a classic excusing condition."I04
Katherine Blakey's support for the Minnesota sex
offender commitment scheme depends centrally on an
interstitial reading of the "utter lack of power to control"
story told by Pearson and Blodgett:
Minnesota's Sexual Psychopathic Personality
Statute draws on the notion of legal insanity to

justify the civil commitment of a person who
has a SPP [Sexual Psychopathic Personality] or
is a SDP [Sexually Dangerous Person].
Because the statutory criteria are parallel to the
irresistible impulse insanity test, the
constitutional requirement that persons be
"mentally ill" before they can be involuntarily
committed in the civil system is satisfied. lOS
There is substantial evidence that the Pearson
court's language on control was similarly interpreted by
other readers. The Pearson "utter lack of power to
control" test, subsequently affirmed by the U.S. Supreme
COurt,106 became a touchstone for litigation on other first
generation sex offender commitment cases. 107 It was
clear that many of the courts in those cases regarded the
"utter lack of power to control" formulation as key to the
legitimacy of the statutes. Appellate decisions upholding
the first generation sexual psychopath statutes commonly
pointed to the legislative adherence to the Pearson "utter
lack of power to control" test. Particularly instructive is
Judge Bazelon's lengthy analysis of the D.C. Sexual
Psychopath Act, which was modeled on the Minnesota
Act, in which he characterized the proper subjects for
commitment under the act as those "too sick to deserve
punishment."108
Judicial commentary subsequent to the Minnesota
court's 1994 reaffirmation of the "utter lack of power to '
control" standard in Blodgett confirms that the story told
by that language is the story of criminal interstitiality.
Justice Gardebring, who formed part of the majority in
Blodgett, explained in a subsequent dissent that the "utter
lack of power to control" formula of Blodgett negates
criminal intent:
Either appellant has the capacity to intend his
vicious acts, in which case he is properly held
accountable in the criminal justice system, or
he suffers from the "utter lack of power to
control [his] sexual impulses," and is therefore
subject to commitment as a psychopathic
personality. How can he simultaneously intend
his acts and manifest an inability to control his
behavior?l09
The narratives of the Washington and Wisconsin
courts invoke the principle of criminal interstitiaIity with
similar subtlety and ambiguity. As in the Minnesota case,
the principle is positioned critically in the narratives of
these courts, appearing in the stories just in time to
vanquish the key challenges to the laws.
The Washington court's opinion discusses whether
the "primary" diagnoses given to the defendants,
"paraphilia not otherwise specified" and "rape as
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paraphilia," actually constitute mental illnesses
warranting intervention outside of the criminal realm. At
the turning point in the court's argument, it chooses
language of volition and control to silence the defendants'
arguments. The court asserts that people who suffer from
paraphilia experience:
recurrent, repetitive, and compulsive urges and
fantasies to commit rapes. These offenders
attempt to control their urges, but the urges
eventually become so strong that they act upon
them, commit rapes, and then feel gUilty
afterwards with a temporary reduction of
urges, only to have the cycle repeat again. This
[is a] cycle of ongoing urges, attempts to
control them, breakdown of those attempts,
and recurrence of the sex crime. IIO
As a result, such people require psychiatric
treatment in order to "gain control" of their urge to
assault. III
To be sure, the Washington court does not announce
the full implications of its focus on volitional control as a
defining characteristic of sex offender commitments. But
two of the commentators supportive of the sex offender
commitment statute clarify the implications of the court's
position. Alexander Brooks, a respected academic whose
writing was relied on by the Washington court at a critical
juncture of its discussion of the meaning of "mental
disability,"112 asserted in his article that sex offender
commitments should be limited to those exhibiting
"uncontrollable pathological rape .... [A] rapist selected
for civil commitment," he argued, "should have a
recurrent, compulsive urge and a pathological need to
repetitively carry out psychologically driven rape."113 He
suggests that the statutory definition is limited to those
whose mental pathology "impairs volitional controls and
causes them to behave in the compUlsive, repetitive,
irrational, and self-destructive ways that are typical of
mental disorders."114 Marie Bochnewich, in a second
article relied on by the Washington court, liS explicitly ties
her support for the sex offender commitment statute to the
principle of criminal interstitiality. She asserts that sex
offender commitments are justified because they are
directed against only those sex offenders who "are less
blameworthy because they are less capable of exercising
self control. . . . These uncontrolled, impUlsive sex
offenders ... are least deserving ofpunishment."116
The Wisconsin court's allusion to criminal
interstitiality is still more subtle. It occurs, as with the
other two courts, in the context of a discussion of whether
the mental disorder at issue is constitutionally sufficient
to support civil commitment. In response to the argument
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that the statutory category of "mental disorder" is too
broad, the court cites the Diagnostic and Statistical
Manual for authority that the term "is only appropriate
when a manifestation of dysfunction crosses the
'boundary between normality and pathology."'117 But
this authoritative definition does not appear to satisfy the
court. In the ultimate volley of its argument, the court
narrows the statutory defmition of "mental disorder."
The court takes the statutory language requiring a
disorder that "predisposes a person to engage in acts of
sexual violence"118 and narrows it: The disorder must be
one that "specifically causes the person to be prone to
commit sexually violent acts in the future."119 This small
change in language is best understood as the court's
attempt to invoke the legitimizing power of criminal
interstitiality by suggesting that sex offender
commitments apply only to those people whose sexual
misbehaviors are "caused" by a disorder and hence
beyond their control. Causation rings of determinism,
which, in tum, seems incompatible with the imposition of
criminal responsibility.120
All three courts tell a similar story in order to
rationalize sex offender commitments as legitimate
"preventive detention." The story told is that sex offender
commitments will be applied to a narrow, well-defined set
of individuals with a particular kind of "condition," one
that is a "mental disorder." In this story, mental disorder
serves a discriminative function.
But all three courts feel compelled to refme even
that story, and the narrowing hovers around the core
notion of criminal interstitiality:
that sex offender
commitments will be applied only where volitional
control is absent or diminished, free will is inoperative,
and punishment is inappropriate. This is the story that
gives sex offender commitment laws their "moral
force."121 This is the story that explains that the subset of
citizens who are committed are just like mentally ill
persons, who may be committed without the stringent
protections that are normally required when the State
deprives a person of liberty.
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF IMPLEMENTING
THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE: A CASE STUDY
THE CONTEXT FOR LINEHAN I
The courts resolve the hard policy choice involved
in sex offender commitment statute challenges by
invoking the principle of criminal interstitiality. But the
resolution in the official narrative is a theoretical,
doctrinal one.
This section explores the explosive
consequences of the Minnesota Supreme Court's actual
implementation of the principle in In re Linehan. 122 This
story demonstrates that the theoretically sound balance
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imposed by the principle of criminal interstitiality falters
upon application. In concrete cases, the powerful public
and political mandate for prevention preempts the
traditional safeguards of the Constitution.
The early years of the Minnesota sex offender
commitment law give context to this story. Pearson
adopted the "utter lack of power to control" test in 1939.
During the 1940s, 114 individuals were committed under
the law. l23 The Minnesota Supreme Court decided one
additional sex offender commitment case during this
period,124 but did not mention the "utter lack of power to
control" test. Nonetheless, in its early years, the law
appears to have had a set of rules-in-use that was
consonant with the espoused excuse-oriented "utter lack
of power to control" legitimating construct. Thus, the law
was used chiefly to hospitalize people who exhibited a
variety of sexual behaviors that were illegal but relatively
benign and non-violent. These commitments were often
relatively brief. l25 They were viewed as a humane
diversion from the criminal system for people whose
"deviant" sexual interests were "more appropriately"
treated as illness than crime. 126 Thus, in a sense the law
served a purpose interstitial to the criminal justice
system. 127
The 1960s through late 1980s saw the law decline
into relative disuse. 128 During this period, the Minnesota
Supreme Court decided six additional cases involving the
psychopathic personality commitment law. \29 In only
one, Clements, did the court even mention the "utter
inability to control" standard. 130 Beginning in the early
1990s, prosecutors in Minnesota rediscovered the law,\31
but the larger social context in which the law had been
developed was forgotten or ignored. The context for the
resurrection of the law was public outcry over sexual
violence committed primarily by recently released
prisoners,132 a context decidedly different from that in
which the law had originally been used and justified. The
passage of time, along with the transformation of social
context, reshaped the rules-in-use.
Rather than a diversionary program for non-violent,
"deviant" individuals, the law became a tool of social
control applicable to the "most dangerous" sexual
predators. \33 In this new context, where the focus became
not how mad but how bad the individual was,I34 the
archaic Pearson test seemed like surplusage. \3S
Of the appellate cases decided in 1990, 1991, and
1992, fifty-seven percent contained no mention of the
Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. 136 In a
small number of cases, the defendant pointed out that the
trial court had ignored the standard. In these cases, the
Court of Appeals uniformly overruled the argument,
stating that the evidence was sufficient to support the
commitment. 137 None of those cases contained any

discussion of the meaning of the "utter lack of power to
control" element.
Gradually, the Court of Appeals began to
acknowledge that Pearson required a showing of "utter
lack of power to control." Still, in these cases, the court
did not discuss the meaning of the term. It characterized
the issue as one of fact and dismissed all claims based on
this mental disorder element by adopting a deferential
review of the trial court's determination.138 In no case
was failure to satisfy the "utter lack of power to control"
test cited as a basis for reversing a sex offender
commitment. 139
Thus, by the time the constitutionality of the sex
offender commitment law was before the Minnesota
Supreme Court in Blodgett, the "utter lack of power to
control" test had been on the books for fifty-five years,
but had hardly been mentioned. It had never served as a
basis for reversing or denying a commitment in an
appellate court case. In Blodgett, a major thrust of the
dissent was that this abandonment of the "utter lack of
power to control" test rendered the statute
unconstitutional. 140 In the majority's analysis, this was
beside the point. The fact that the statute could be applied
incorrectly did not mean that it had no legitimate sphere.
The court reaffirmed the Pearson "utter lack of power to
control" test as the legitimizing element of the statute,
and, in effect, promised to use appellate review to bring
the rules-in-use into concordance with this official
narrative. 141
B.

THE MINNESOTA SUPREME COURT IMPLEMENTS
THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE: LINEHAN I

Five months after deciding Blodgett, and fifty-five
years to the day after Pearson announced the "utter lack
of power to control" test, the Minnesota Supreme Court
made good on its promise. For the first time in the
statute's fifty-five year history, the supreme court
reversed a sex offender commitment. In In re Linehan, 142
the court held that the state had failed to meet its burden
of proving the "utter lack of power to control" element. It
ordered 53 year-old Dennis Darol Linehan released.
During the preceding fifty-five year period, over
300 people had been quietly deprived of their liberty
under a law whose constitutionality was justified on the
basis of the principle of criminal interstitiaIity .143 When,
for the first time, the supreme court actually implemented
that principle, all hell broke loose. The story of the
Linehan case and its aftermath unambiguously show that
the public and the political process want an official
narrative for sex offender commitments that paints a
picture of legitimization but does not pay the concomitant
price.
On March 25, 1992, less than two months before
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Linehan's mandatory release from prison, the Ramsey
County (Minnesota) Attorney's office filed a petition for
his commitment as a Psychopathic Personality. Linehan,
a convicted kidnapper, strangled his 14 year-old victim in
a 1965 attempted sexual assault, escaped from prison in
1975, and within two weeks from the time of the escape
attempted to sexually assault a 12 year-old. By 1992,
Linehan had served twenty-seven years in prison. After a
two week bench trial involving four mental heath experts,
Linehan was committed as a psychopathic personality.
The commitment relieved the State of its legal obligation
to parole him.144
On June 30, 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed Linehan's commitment for failure to satisfY the
Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. The
prosecutor filed a petition for rehearing, delaying
Linehan's release. During the ensuing weeks, public and
political attention began to focus on the court's decision
and Linehan's impending release. The matter headlined
local news coverage for many days in a row: 4S A
prominent legislator characterized the chief justice of the
Minnesota Supreme Court, who wrote for the majority in
Linehan, as the "zookeeper" who proposed "let[ting] the
tigers out one by one to see if they're dangerous.,,146 A
previously appointed Sexual Predators Task Force l47 held
legislative hearings attended by the Governor and the
Attorney General to assess the effects of the Linehan
decision. Politicians characterized the court's decision as
potentially devastating to Minnesota's efforts to use sex
offender commitment statutes to prevent sexual
violence. 148 The Attorney General framed the question
generated by Linehan thusly: "The question before us
today is simple: how do we protect the public from some
of the most dangerous criminals in society[?)"149 He
proposed "tough" new laws, including a "sexually
dangerous persons" commitment act that eliminated the
Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. ISO The
Governor agreed to call a special session of the legislature
if the Task Force and legislative leaders could agree on a
new sex offender commitment law.lsl
On August 15, 1994, the Minnesota Supreme Court
denied Ramsey County's petition for rehearing. On that
date, the State lost the authority to hold Linehan as a
"patient" and was obligated to release him on parole. The
Linehan matter became front page news and the lead
story on local television news broadcasts. ls2
The
Governor hastily ordered Linehan "paroled" to a cottage
on the grounds of the state prison. He was guarded
twenty-four hours a day by two guards and required to
wear an electronic bracelet around his ankle. The State
secretly installed hidden television surveillance cameras
in the cottage and monitored Linehan's moves via
monitors in an RV "command post" parked 100 yards
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away. The taxpayers of Minnesota paid hundreds of
thousands of dollars to provide this security for
Linehan. 153
Between August 15 and August 30, media attention
intensified.
Local talk show hosts, one of whom
conducted interviews from her back yard hot tub,
vigorously solicited Linehan and his attorneys to be
guests on talk shows. Tabloid television shows such as
"Geraldo" and "Behind Bars" sought interviews with
Linehan and his attorneys. National news wires carried
the story.IS4 CBS Morning News juxtaposed an interview
of Linehan's 1975 attempted rape victim with a debateformat discussion of the legal issues between one of
Linehan's attorneys and the Ramsey County Attorney.lss
The underlying question posed in all the news coverage
was whether the state could keep a "sex psychopath"
locked up even though he had served his time in prison:
Will the constitution stand in the way of society's efforts
to stop this man from raping again?
On August 30, 1994, the Governor called the
legislature into special session to debate the proposed
Sexually Dangerous Persons Commitment ACt. IS6 This
Act explicitly rejects the Pearson "utter lack of power to
control" standard, thereby providing that persons with a
"mental disorder" may be civilly committed even if they
retain full control of their sexual behavior. 157 Its chief
advocate, the Attorney General, acknowledged that the
constitutionality of the new law was unclear. IS8 Media
editorials split as to the constitutionality and advisability
of using civil commitment to lock up sex offenders after
they have served their full criminal sentences. IS9 The
legislature retained the old Psychopathic Personality Law
on the books as a safeguard in case the courts determined
that the new law was unconstitutional. 160 Despite the
constitutional doubts and the greater breadth of the new
law as compared to the old psychopathic personality
commitment statute (which had garnered only four of
seven votes on the Minnesota Supreme Court), both
houses of the legislature passed the bill unanimously. 161
The Governor immediately signed the legislation. 162 On
September 1, 1994, the new Sexually Dangerous Persons
Act became effective, and the Ramsey County Attorney's
office filed a petition against Linehan under the new
law. 163
Hundreds of sex offenders are released from prison
each year in Minnesota. l64 What explains the intensity of
the public and political reaction to Linehan's anticipated
release? Linehan's crimes were indeed serious, and his
case was notorious in Minnesota even before the 1994
decision. 16s In part, the public response reflected the fear
that a notorious rapist/murderer would be released to
repeat his crimes. Amplified in the heat of the highly
contested political campaign of the chief prosecutor for a
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seat on the United States Senate, this fear became a
firestonn fed by political posturing on crime and
violence.
But there is another much more compelling story.
This story confinns the moral and legal centrality of the
"utter lack of power to control" test. In Linehan, the state
got caught with its hand in the "preventive detention" till,
helping itself to "civil commitment" without paying the
"utter lack of power to control" price for it. Hypocrisy
sharpens the sting of discovery and correction.
Expressions of outrage stemming from this discovery are
a measure of the moral distance between the state's false
claim of legitimacy and the newly exposed rules-in-use.
The Linehan decision was not a simple piece of statutory
construction. It unearthed and threatened to remedy an
embarrassing
hypocrisy
involving
fundamental
democratic values.
Taken together, Blodgett and Linehan demonstrate
the centrality of the mental disorder element to the
official narrative of sex offender commitments. Blodgett
adopted the test, and Linehan, in the face of a firestonn of
protest, insisted on applying it. Together, these two cases
suggest an -official.narrative that legitimates sex offender
commitments by applying a real boundary, one defined
by the principle of interstitiality. But the Linehan story
illustrates the enonnity of the.public and political pressure
underlying the mandate for prevention. In an unusual
special session, the legislature unanimously enacted the
Sexually Dangerous Persons Comm~tment Act, sending a
clear and chilling message to the judiciary: Narratives
about the constitutionality of sex offender. commitments
are fine as long as they do not interfere with the mandate
for prevention.
IV. EXPOSING THE RULES-IN-USE: "MENTAL
DISORDER" BECOMES A LEGAL FICTION
In the previous part, this article described a visible
enforcement of the official narrative and the frrestonn of
public and political reaction it generated. In this part, the
article examines the actual practice of sex offender
commitments in Mmnesota in the post-Linehan I period.
With a larger corpus of reported sex offender appellate
commitment cases than any other state with a second
generation sex offender commitment law, Minnesota
serves as an appropriate subject of study to understand the
actual operation of sex offender commitments in concrete
cases. In evaluating the rules used by lower courts, this
article looks to whether the "mental disorder" element
serves a discriminative function, and, if so, whether such
discrimination is justified by respect for the principle of
criminal interstitiality.
In the corpus of Minnesota cases, the "mental
disorder" element fails on both grounds. In applying the

"utter lack .of power to control" test, the courts have
created, a set of rules with no discriminative or
justificatory power. In the nIles-in-use, the mental
disorder element becomes a legal fiction, an element of
proof that must be invoked, but that does not do any
substantive work in the litigation.
The task offonnulating workable rules-in-use based
on the "utter lack of power to control" test has fallen to
the Minnesota Court of Appeals. The task is certainly not
an easy one. The rules-in-use must set out a non-arbitrary
method for distinguishing between those who merely did
not, and those who could not, control their sexual
misbehavior. It is the inference from behavior (which the
individual did not control) to capacity (which the
individual could not control) that furnishes the "mental
disorder" justification for sex offender commitments.
This concept of "volitional dysfunction" has
consistently baffled judges, forensic professionals, and
philosophers.l 66 If the "utter lack of power to control"
test is to accomplish the discriminative function required
for legitimization, the Court of Appeals and similarly
situated appellate courts must develop a coherent theory
of its meaning. Unfortunately, despite twenty-five cases
raising the issue during the post-Linehan period, the
Court of Appeals has thus far failed to do SO.167 Though
the court appears to engage in a process of reasoning
about the "utter lack of power to control" test, nowhere in
the corpus of its cases can one find a straightforward
declarative sentence explaining how one distinguishes
incapacity to control (a mental disorder) from a failure to
control (criminal behavior).168
The Court of Appeals has not only failed to establish
a workable test, it sends conflicting messages that
frustrate efforts to extrapolate any coherent pattern. In
some of its opinions, it has seemed to focus on
impulsiveness as the meaning of "utter lack of power to
control.,,169 In others, the court has taken pains to explain
how behavior that appears planned and deliberate can
reflect "utter lack of power to control."170 In some cases,
the court has pointed to the individual's lack of
acknowledgment that his behavior is wrong. l71 In others,
the court has found a mental disorder where "he knows
what he is doing and that it is wrong, but he chooses to do
it anyway,,,172 In some opinions, the court has relied on
evidence of the individual's misbehavior in controlled
settings,I73 In others, only the individual misbehavior
when not supervised supported such a finding,174 Finally,
in some cases, the court has also suggested that proof that
the individual's "will" is overwhelmed by strong sexual
impulses,175 or that the individual's behavior is strongly
"compulsive" points to a mental disorder,I76 In others, it
is the strength of the individual's will to have sex that
provides the factual support,177 Frequently, what supports
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the finding is simply that the individual has repeatedly
engaged in prohibited sexual behavior despite the
consequences,178 a characterization that would apply to all
repeat sex offenders.
Even the two cases in which the court reversed a
finding of "utter lack of power to control" do not help
develop a coherent theory. In In re Schweninger, the
court reversed a commitment of a non-violent pedophile.
The court clearly understood "utter lack of power to
control" as requiring impulsiveness and found that the
individual's "planned and calculated" behaviors were
inconsistent with such a finding. 179 The Schweninger case
came directly on the heels of Linehan and appeared to be
the beginning of an "impulsiveness" theory of "utter lack
of power to control." But the court quickly altered its
course. In In re Bieganowski and a series of other cases,
the court explained that planning and deliberation could
be consistent with "utter lack of power to control.,,180
The Court of Appeals has reversed only one other
case since Linehan. In In re Mentzos,181 the court
overturned the lower court's "utter lack of power to
control" conclusion, but only on the grounds that it was
not supported by any expert testimony. Mentzos is devoid
of any theory defining what constitutes "utter lack of
power to control."
Although the Court of Appeals has failed to
articulate a theory, it is possible that a theory is inherent
in its cases. To test this hypothesis, some principled
theories of volitional incapacity are set out here for
comparison with the court's decisions.
In the most ubiquitous image underlying the "utter
lack of power to control" concept, the individual has a
"predatory sex impulse" and lacks the "power to control
it.,,182 The "power" and the "impulse" are seen as two
separate parts of the individual self. 183 The metaphorical
image is of the person's "higher" self struggling against
the overpowering sexual impulses of the "lower" self.
Psychologists describe this mechanism as "egodystonic,,,184 in the sense that the person "himself' is
unhappy with the sexual impulses, tries to suppress or
contain them, but eventuaIIy fails.
The person is
described as being "overpowered" by the strength and
intensity of the impulses. 18s
The volitional theories of both Morse l86 and
Schoppl87 are consistent with this ego-dystonic approach
and have the potential to perform a real sorting function.
These theories translate volitional dysfunction into
intense psychic pain as well as impaired cognitive and
rationality functions. Psychologists and psychiatrists
could identify circumstances in which psychic pain is a
predominant feature or in which cognitive and rationality
functions are severely impaired. 188 These are psychic
phenomena that are, subject to the usual epistemological
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problems associated with measuring mental and
emotional states, relatively verifiable. 189 To make the test
more principled, the courts would be required to set a
threshold, as a matter of law, beyond which the "pain" or
the cognitive impairment would have to pasS. 19O If this
threshold were equivalent to the threshold for excusing
criminal behavior, then the test would truly fulfill the
theme of criminal interstitiality evoked in the official
narrative.
The Court of Appeals' early post-Linehan decision
in Schweninger appeared to flirt with this theory of
volitional dysfunction.
In Schweninger, the court
reversed a commitment because Schweninger's behavior
was "planned and calculated," distinguishing "plotting,
planning, seductions, payments, and coercive behavior ..
. from an impUlsive lack of control."191 In this line of
reasoning, planning is evidence that "conscious cognitive
processes have intervened,"192 negating the conclusion
that it is the "lower" impulses that are "in control" of the
person's actions. 193 In In re Kunshier l94 the court seems
to consider both Morse's pain theory and Schopp's
rational impairment theory, citing testimony that
Kunshier's "impulse to rape becomes all intrusive" and
that his behavior is "impulse driven past any point of
rational control.,,19S Similarly, in In re Hart, the court
recited that the individual "experiences intense urges to
sexuaIIy offend despite a victim's protests or resistance,
and has profound difficulty controlling his behavior." 196
However, the court never fully articulated this
theory of volitional dysfunction, did not set legal
thresholds, and quickly abandoned any required showing
of impulsiveness. In Bieganowski and Mayfield, the court
decided that "uncontrollability" was consistent with
"planning and controlled behavior."197 In addition, the
court made clear that it did not have in mind any sort of
internal pain or internal struggle test. In both Adolphson
and Irwin, the court appears most impressed with the fact
that the individuals seemed to view their deviant sexual
behavior as acceptable. 198
Other theories of volitional dysfunction do not rely
on a bifurcation of the self into "higher" and "lower"
parts. In these theories the individual's crimes flow from
some core of his personality structure, not from an
"internal struggle" between the lower impulses and the
higher faculties. In this "ego-syntonic" approach to the
control issues, all aspects of the personality are
consonant. Volitional dysfunction is found when the
sexual violence is so much a part of the person's
psychological makeup that he "cannot" make any other
choices. l99 Irwin and Adolphson, discussed above, both
appear to adhere to this sort of a theory.zoo
At a literal level, integrated self theories are much
too broad. Acting in accord with the core of one's own
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personality is certainly not a sign of volitional
dysfunction, but rather of normal psychological
functioning.20 1 But there is a narrower, more charitable
reading of the integrated self test which is much more
discriminative and perhaps closer to the principle of
criminal interstitiality. Under this narrower construction,
action is beyond the actor's volitional control to the
extent that it would be continued despite negative
environmental consequences. According to philosophers
Culver and Gert, if a person always acts contrary to
strong negative disincentives in the environment, he or
she lacks the volitional ability to act otherwise. 202 The
American Psychiatric ·Association Task Force Report
agrees, arguing that the best evidence of the ability to
control behavior is a person's adaptation of his or her
behavior to changing environmental conditions. 203
The underlying theory is that the consequences
flowing from misbehavior are so negative and, more
importantly, so patent, that all "rational," "volitionallyable" individuals would have avoided the misbehavior.204
However, there are convincing arguments that even this
narrowed integrated self test is not a meaningful account
of volitional dysfunction. It is not discriminative, because
virtually all repeat criminal behavior fits this test.2°s
Thus, it fails to discriminate between those who "could
not" and those who merely "did not" control their
behaviors.
At a more philosophical level, Daniel Dennett's
insightful discussion of this issue shows that the
conclusion that a person "could not have done otherwise"
may say something about the "character" of the person,
but says nothing about any "dysfunction" or about his or
her moral or criminal responsibility:
"Here I stand," Luther said. "I can do no
other." Luther claimed that he could do no
other, that his conscience made it impossible
for him to recant. He might, of course, have
been wrong, or have been deliberately
overstating the truth. But even if he Wasperhaps especially ifhe was-his declaration is
testimony to the fact that we simply do not
exempt someone from blame or praise for an
act because we think he could do no other.
Whatever Luther was doing, he was not trying
to duck responsibility.206
But given that even the philosophers are undecided
on the point, it is worth noting that some decisions of the
Court of Appeals appear at least implicitly to adopt the
environmental-consequences theory. These cases point
out that the defendant continued to engage in criminal or
anti-social activity despite numerous sanctions for his bad
behavior. For example, in Patterson, the court referred,

with apparent approval, to the state hospital's report that
assumed that "'lack of power to control' relates to
choosing to commit the offenses despite negative
consequences.,,207 In Kunshier, the court cited testimony
that the individual's "sexual impulses override any
normal fear of capture or consequences, and he has
admitted feeling 'fearless' while committing these
assaults.,,20s
If the court had hewed to this environmentalconsequences test, its "utter lack of power to control"
jurisprudence might have had some legitimizing
discriminative power. But the court's 1995 Toulou
decision demonstrates that the court had no such
narrowed test in mind. Turning the theory on its head, the
court cited Toulou's conformance to external stimuli as
the central evidence supporting the fmding of "utter lack
of power to control.,,209
This analysis shows that the concept of "utter lack of
power to control," as established by the Minnesota Court
of Appeals, has neither discriminative nor justificatory
content. Instead, the court relies on pseUdo-reasoning:
statements purporting to sound like legal reasoning that
are in reality tautological and hence non-explanatory.
Recall that the central, and most difficult, task of the
"utter lack of power to control" construct is to
demonstrate that a mental dysfunction legitimizes sex
offender commitments. The key move is to infer mental
incapacity from behavior. The philosophical theories
provide rules for making that transformation, but the
Court of Appeals has followed none of them. Consider
the following, which the court has proffered as
explanations of the inference from behavior to mental
incapacity:
•

"He explained that an utter lack of control begins
when the individual has an urge that cannot be
delayed."
Here, "experts explained how
uncontrollability could occur with planning and
controlled behavior."210

•

"The psychologists' explanations show that, while
Young may show planning and premeditation by his
grooming behavior, his behavior is nonetheless
impUlsive and without volitional control in that he
acts upon uncontrollable desires when presented
with the opportunity to sexually abuse' young
girls.,,211

•

"The trial court concluded that Patterson
'demonstrates an utter lack of power to control his
conduct with regard to sexual matters.' In support
of this finding, Dr. [M] testified that he believed that
Patterson had an utter lack of power to control his
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sexual impulses. Once 'the impulse has been
created,' [M] explained, Patterson 'cannot control
over time the need to act upon the urge. ",212
o

"Dr. [M] testified that appellant met this criteria
(sic), because once appellant has the urge to be
sexually active with an individual, he is compelled
to do so, whether it occurs in several minutes or
several hours."213

o

"Dr. [F] defines the term 'utter lack of control' in
terms of an impulse control problem 'in which there
is an inability to stop one's behavior despite being in
an area of risk of being apprehended or caught.,,,214

Though these passages have the rhetorical form of
explanations, they simply replace one abstract
psychological construct ("utter lack of power to control")
with another equally opaque psychological construct
("inability to stop," "compelled to do so," "cannot
control,"
"uncontrollable
desires,"
"cannot be
delayed").215 They do not explain how "did not" is
transformed into "could not,"216 and hence they do not
perform the necessary discriminative and justificatory
tasks claimed for the mental disorder element.

V.

HOLDING THE COURTS TO HARD
CHOICES: CLOSING THE GAP BETWEEN
THE OFFICIAL NARRATIVE AND THE
RULES-IN-USE
Courts confronting challenges to sex offender
commitment statutes face two strong and opposing pulls.
On one hand, the mandate for prevention demands longoverdue, creative action to prevent sexual violence. On
the other, fundamental American legal values-the "great
safeguards" that American jurisprudence enforces when
the State deprives its citizens of their liberty-abhor
unlimited, unprincipled preventive detention.
Courts have three choices to resolve this dilemma.
The first two acknowledge that the two pulls are largely
irreconcilable in the context of civil commitment. The
first path strikes down sex offender commitment laws in
order to maintain the primacy of the criminal system in
addressing antisocial conduct. The second path upholds
sex offender commitment laws, frankly acknowledging
that they represent a hitherto unprecedented breach in our
reliance on the criminal justice system. Two courts have
taken the first path.217 None has taken the second path
successfully.218
The third path is the one taken by the supreme
courts of Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Washington. These
courts uphold sex offender commitment schemes in order
to vindicate the mandate for protection. But they also
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insist on respect for the traditional constitutional
protections and the primacy of the criminal law that those
protections entail. They reconcile this dichotomy through
a narrative that portrays sex offender commitments as
business-as-usual civil commitments that fit comfortably
into the traditional and limited exemption from criminal
constitutional protections.
The core truth of this narrative is that civil
commitments are legitimate to the extent that they fill
only the interstices unaddressed by the criminal law. This
truth is a hard truth, because it stands precisely in the path
of the mandate for prevention. But it is the truth,
nonetheless, and that is why the three courts were
compelled to include it in their narratives.
But even if the three courts have told the truth about
the principle of criminal interstitiality, their narratives are
nonetheless fiction. Creative, aggressive, preventive civil
confmement simply is not, and cannot be, consistent with
the primacy of the criminal protections in our system.
The courts have sought to preserve the integrity of their
narratives by invoking the principle of criminal
interstitiality; but in doing so, they have told a story that
cannot be true.
What are the consequences of a system that
countenances the fictionalization of its legitimizing
narrative? Chris Argyris and Donald Schon, in a
somewhat different context, suggest that a system that
does not act to bring its "espoused theories"219 into
consonance with its actual practices is in, at best, a
"tenuous equilibrium.,,22o Eventually, the dissonance will
come out. And when it does, it tends to come out in
revolutionary rather than evolutionary ways. 221 A system
based on fiction invites collapse.
Courts reviewing sex offender commitment laws
should evaluate them as they truly operate. Espoused
claims for legitimacy need to be checked against actual
rules-in-use. The Minnesota experience demonstrates that
the legitimizing constructions of high courts can be
systematically fictionalized by the lower courts. Indeed,
given the strong mandate for prevention and the
narrowness of the legitimiZing conditions, it is likely that
the experience of other states will be similar. The
mandate for prevention seeks to prevent criminal
behavior. The fundamental values of our Constitution
and our Nation tell the hard truth that crime is punished
and prevented through the criminal justice system.
Legitimizing narratives that minimize this truth will, in
the end, be fiction.
Prevention of sexual violence ought to have as it
foundation stories of pain, response, and legitimacy that
are truth, not fiction. 222 Otherwise, prevention of sexual
violence will find its fate tied to unlimited, unprincipled
preventive detention. The truth about sexual violence
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cannot be vindicated by doing such violence to the "great
safeguards" of our constitutional and moral values.

NOTES
1 See John Q. La Fond, Washington's Sexually Violent
Predator Law: A Deliberate Misuse ofthe Therapeutic State for
Social Control, 15 U. PuGET SOUND L. REv. 655, 661 (1992)
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legislation); William D. Pithers, Relapse Prevention with Sexual
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343 (William L. Marshall et aI. eds., 1990) (describing
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2 See Millard v. Harris, 406 F.2d 964, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1968)
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and practical approach to the problem of persons unable to
control their sexual emotions. "') (quoting SENATE COMM. ON
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Emotionally-Driven Punishment, 29 SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 125,
145 (1995) (stating that the purpose of the 1939 Minnesota
Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act was to enable the
state to commit individuals before they commit "horrifying
crimes").

3 See MiNN. STAT. § 244.25, subd. 7 (l994) (requiring a risk
assessment of sex offenders prior to their release from a
correctional facility); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.151
(West Supp. 1996) (providing for the notification of county
prosecutors prior to the release of persons from a correctional
facility who may meet the commitment criteria); OFFICE OF TIlE
LEGISLATIVE AUDITOR, STATE OF MINNEsOTA, PSYCHOPATHIC
PERSONALITY COMMITMENT LAW, at xii (Feb. 1994)
("Approximately 90 percent of those committed under the
psychopathic personality statute since January 1991 had just
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the Word, 15 U. PUGET SOUND L. REv. 525, 566-67 (1992)
(seriatim use of sex offender commitments is "unique"); John L.

Kirwin, Civil Commitment of Sexual Predators: Statutory and
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at 22.

4 See Alexander D. Brooks, The ConstitutionalitY and
Morality of Civilly Committing Violent Sexual Predators, 15 U.
PuGET SOUND L. REv. 709 (1992).
5 The following are recently enacted sex offender
commitment laws: ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-4601-4609
(West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 6600-6608
(West 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 709C.1-.12 (West Supp.
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ANN. § 253B.02, subds. 7a, 18a, and 18b and § 253B.185 (West
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Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989).
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7 Sex offender commitment laws are often applied against
people who have served their entire sentences for crimes they
have committed.
Imposing an additional sentence of
incarceration for the same crime would violate the protection
against double jeopardy. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S.
435, 440 (l989); Artway v. Attorney Gen., 876 F. Supp. 666
(D.NJ. 1995); Young v. Weston, No. C94-480C, 1995 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 12928 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 25,1995). Sex offender
commitment statutes claim that they can impose additional
periods of incarceration without violating this provision. See In
re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 188 (Minn. 1996); In re Young,
857 P.2d 989 (Wash. 1993).
8 The prohibition against ex post facto laws prevents the state
from increasing a person's criminal sentence after it has been
imposed. See Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41-42
(1990) (citing Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390-92
(1789»; Artway, 876 F. Supp. 666; Young v. Weston, 1995
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12928.

9 See generally Duncan v. Louisian~ 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968) (discussing general nature of right to, and importance of,
jury trial). Some sex offenger commitment laws provide for
jury trials. ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4605 (West Supp.
1995); IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.5 (West Supp. 1996); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 59-29a06 (1994); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
71.09.050 (West Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.03(3)
(West Supp. 1996).
10 Some sex offender commitment laws require the highest
standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. ARIz. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 13-4606 (West Supp. 1995); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE
§ 6604 (West 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. §59-29a07 (1994);
WASH. REv. CODE § 71.09.060 (1995); WIS. STAT. § 980.05
(1994); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Others
require some lesser showing. MINN. STAT. § 253B.18 (l995)
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(requiring proof by clear and convmcmg evidence). It is
generally held that the highest standard .(i.e., "beyond a
reasonable doubt") does not apply to civil commitments, see
Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1978), though the precise
reach of Addington has not been adjudicated.

Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, 138-39 (Wis. 1995) (Abrahamson, J.,
dissenting), petition for cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 7, 1996) (No. 958204). Turner had sodomized and murdered nine-year-old Lisa
Ann French in 1973. See Turner v. State, 150 N.W.2d 706
(Wis. 1977).

II A key feature of civil commitment incarceration is that it is
predicated on the existence of a status, often expressed as a
requirement for the existence of a "mental disorder." See CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a), (c) (West Supp. 1996); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 709C.2, subd. 4 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 59-29a02(a) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02,
subd. 18b (West Supp. 1996); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
71.09.020(1) (West 1992 & Supp. 1996); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
980.01(7) (West Supp. 1996); see also Paul H. Robinson,
Foreword: The Criminal - Civil Distinction and Dangerous
Blameless Offenders, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 693
(1993).

Professors Rideout and La Fond explore the transformation
of these stories into law. See La Fond, supra note 1, at 671-77;
J. Christopher Rideout, So What's in a Name? A Rhetorical
Reading of Washington 's Sexually Violent Predators Act, 15 U.
PUGET SOUND L. REv. 781, 783 (1992) (examining "the
originating narratives that led to the demand for a change in
Washington law regarding violent and predatory sex
offenders").

12 See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTI, JR., CRIMINAL
LAW § 3.2, at 195 (2d ed. 1986) ("[T]he common law crimes are
defined in terms of act or omission to act, and statutory crimes
are unconstitutional unless so defined."); see also C. Peter
Erlinder, Minnesota's Gulag: Involuntary Treatment for the
Politically Ill, 19 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 99 (1993) (discussing
constitutional deficiencies of Minnesota's Psychopathic
Personality Law).
13 See generally Boerner, supra note 3; Lafond, supra note I;
see also Alexander D. Brooks, The Incapacitation by Civil
Commitment of Pathologically Violent Sex Offenders, in LAW,
MENTAL HEALTH, AND MENTAL DISORDER 385 (Bruce Sales &
Daniel Shuman eds., 1996); Kirwin, supra note 3; Kelly A.
McCaffrey, Comment, The Civil Commitment of Sexually
Violent Predators in Kansas: A Modern Law for Modern
Times, 42 KAN. L. REv. 887 (1994).
14 Kansas' Sexually Violent Predator Act was passed "[i]n
response to the urging of an Ad Hoc Sexual Offender Task
Force given impetus by the parents of Stephanie Schmidt ...."
In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129, 140 (Larson, J., dissenting), cert.
granted, 116 S. Ct. 2522 (1996). Stephanie Schmidt was
kidnapped, sodomized, and murdered in 1993. See State v.
Gideon, 894 P.2d 850, 857 (Kan. 1995). Megan's Law,
consisting of a group of bills concerning sex offenders, "was
named after the second female child abducted, raped and
murdered during (1993 in New Jersey]." Doe v. Poritz, 662
Washington's Community
A.2d 367, 372 (N.J. 1995).
Protection Act of 1990 was passed after an investigation by a
task force commissioned by the governor, which was convened
as the result of "two violent crimes: the murder of a Seattle
woman by an offender on work release, and the violent sexual
attack on a young Tacoma boy." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 992
(citing GOVERNOR'S TASK FORCE ON COMMUNITY PROTECTION,
FINAL REpORT, at I-I). The enactment of Wisconsin's sexual
predator law "was preceded by a widely publicized, highly
politicized and extremely emotional public debate following the
release of the notorious sex offender Gerald Turner." State v.
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15 Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1383 (1996) (quoting
United States v. Chisolm, 149 F. 284, 288 (S.D. Ala 1906)).

16 See Brooks, supra note 13, at 385, framing the question
posed by sex offender commitment statutes as:
... whether a state is helpless to protect women and
children from the palpable dangers caused by
previously convicted dangerous sex offenders who
are again at large, who are known to be recidivistic
and pathological, and whose persistent and repeated
sex crimes over a long period of time establish
beyond a reasonable doubt that their future victims
are in immense danger.

17 See infra notes 47-49.
18 In Professor Perlin's terminology, the official narrative
becomes "pretextualized" when it is applied in the concrete
tough choices confronted by lower courts. See generally
Michael L. Perlin, Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Understq.nding
the Sanist and Pre textual Bases of Mental Disability Lqw, 20
NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 369 (1994).

19 See Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992); Millard, 406
F.2d at 972; Williamson v. United States, 184 F.2d 280,282 (2d
Cir. 1950).
Both the Minnesota and Washington laws define
commitable sex offenders partly in terms of past criminal acts.
Washington's law defines "sexually violent predator," in part, as
a person who "has been convicted of or charged with a crime of
sexual violence." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1)
(West 1992 & Supp. 1996). Minnesota's law is somewhat less
direct. That law defines a "sexually dangerous person" as a
person who "has engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (West Supp.
1996). "Harmful sexual conduct" is "sexual conduct that
creates a substantial likelihood of serious physical or emotional
harm ... [to the victim]." Id. at subd. 7a The commission of
certain crimes will raise a presumption that the victim will suffer
serious physical or emotional harm. Id. at subd. 7b.

20

In contrast, the standard civil commitment language in

STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW

HeinOnline -- 8 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 86 1997

SEX OFFENDER COMMITMENTS

Minnesota and Washington is not defined in criminal terms.
See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 17 (West 1992)
(commitment of persons "mentally ill and dangerous to the
public"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.05.020(1) (West 1992)
(commitment of "gravely disabled" persons).
21 Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979), begins from the
proposition that civil commitment of mentally ill persons is
constitutional. See John Q. La Fond, An Examination 0/ the
Purposes 0/ Involuntary Civil Commitment, 30 BUFF. L. REv.
499,501 (1981) ("The power of the state to confine mentally ill
persons who pose imminent danger to themselves or to third
persons was established at early common law."); Developments
in the Law - Civil Commitment o/the Mentally Ill., 87 HARv. L.
REv. 1190, 1208 (1974) [hereinafter Developments - Civil
Commitment] ("[T]he Supreme Court [has] suggested that the
parens patriae power, like the police power, is rooted in the
very nature of the state in modem society.") (citing Mormon
Church v. United States, 136 U.S. 1,57 (1890)).

24 See In re Young, 857 P.2d 989; In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d
129.
25 The legislative preambles to the Washington and Kansas sex
offender commitment laws support this observation. WASH.
REv. CODE § 71.09.090 (1995) ("[A] small but extremely
dangerous group of sexually violent predators exist who do not
have a mental disease or defect that renders them appropriate for
the existing involuntary treatment act ...."); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29aOl (1995) (containing language essentially identical to
that used by the Washington legislature). See generally Robert
F. Schopp & Barbara J. Sturgis, Sexual Predators and Legal
Mental Illness/or Civil Commitment, 13 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 437
(1995); Robert M. Wettstein, A Psychiatric Perspective on
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute, 15 U. PuGET
SOUND L. REv. 597 (1992); Bruce J. Winick, Ambiguities in the
Legal Meaning and Significance 0/ Mental Illness, 3 PSYCHOL.
PuB. POL'y & L. 534 (1995).

Although we have not had the opportunity to
consider the outer limits of a State's authority to
civilly commit an unwilling individual, our decision
in Donaldson makes clear that due process requires
at a minimum a showing that the person is mentally
ill and either poses a danger to himself or others or
is incapable of "surviving safely in freedom[.]"

26 See BRAKEL ET AL., supra note 1, at 329 ("The introduction
of psychotropic medications has revolutionized the treatment of
the mentally ill, vastly diminishing the number of persons
needing institutionalization and significantly relaxing the terms
of confinement for those who are institutionalized."); cf
O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 582-83 (1975) (Burger,
C.J., concurring) ("There can be little doubt that in the exercise
of its police power a State may confine individuals solely to
protect society from the dangers of significant antisocial acts or
communicable disease.").

Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373, 1383 (1996) (citations
omitted).

27 See Jones v. United States, 463 U.S. 354 (1983); see also
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972).

23 Young v. Weston, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS; In re Hendricks,
912 P.2d 129; In re Linehan, 518 N.W.2d 609 (Minn. 1994)
[Linehan I}; In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910 (Minn. 1994), cert.
denied, 115 S.Ct. 146 (1994); In re Young, 857 P.2d 989
(Wash. 1993); State v. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105 (Wis. 1995),
petition/or cert. filed, (U.S. Mar. 7, 1996); Post, 541 N.W.2d
115. It is arguable that the jurisprudential thread addressing the
substantive issues pre-dated the sex offender commitment cases.
Thus, in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), Chief
Justice Burger's concurrence suggested that commitment based
on dangerousness alone might be constitutional. See id. at 58283. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 755 (1987), upheld a
form of preventive confinement without mental illness, fueling
speculation that mental illness was not, in general, a necessary
predicate for preventive confinement. Salerno used a balancing
test, suggesting that preventive confinement might be justifiable
if the state's interest was high enough to outweigh the liberty
interest of the individual. In Foucha v. LouiSiana, 504 U.S. 71
(1992), the State of Louisiana pushed that theory and lost.
Foucha has become the fulcrum against which the sex offender
commitment cases are litigated. For a full discussion of this
issue, see Eric S. Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence: Setting
Principled Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender
Commitments, 72 IND. L.J. 157 (1996) [hereinafter Janus,
Preventing Sexual Violence].

28 See Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).

22 As recently as the 1996 term, the Supreme Court said:

29 The Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions upholding sex
offender commitment statutes claim no support from the parens
patriae power of the state. See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at
914 (government's compelling interest is "the protection of
members of the public from persons who have an uncontrollable
impulse to sexually assault."); In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d at
181(state's interest in treating sex offenders "serves and falls
within the state's interest in protecting the public from sexual
assault.").
Parens patriae rationales are not entirely missing from the
discussions of sex offender commitment laws. See Allen v.
Illinois, 478 U.S. 364, 373 (1986); In re Young, 857 P.2d at
998-1000; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122. Note that in neither
Young, 857 P.2d at 994-96, nor Post, 541 N.W.2d at 119-20,
does the statement of the facts support the notion that the parens
patriae doctrine is properly invoked because the defendant is
incompetent.
30 In general, sex offenders are not incompetent to make
treatment decisions. Paraphilia, one of the major diagnostic
categories into which sex offenders are placed, denotes deviant
sexual arousal patterns. Like other personality disorders, the
paraphilia designation does not necessarily entail impaired
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cognitive processes, but rather maladaptive, rigid, and persistent
pattems of behavior. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
522-25,633 (4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IVJ; see generally
THEODORE MILLON, DISORDERS OF PERSONALITY (1981); Emily
Campbell, Comment, The Psychopath and the Definition of
"Mental Disease or Defect" Under the Model Penal Code Test
of Insanity: A Question of Psychology or a Question of Law?,
69 NEB. L. REv. 190 (1990).
31 See Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 610; In re Blodgett, 510
N.W.2d at 910-12; cf WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.025
(West Supp. 1996) (aiming Washington's sex predator law at
both those found incompetent and those about to be released
from prison).

32 See Williamson, 184 F.2d at 282 ("Imprisonment to protect
society from predicted but unconsummated offenses is so
unprecedented in this country and so fraught with danger of
excesses and injustice that I am loath to resort to it."); Millard,
406 F.2d at 972 ("Substantively, there is serious question
whether the state can ever confine a citizen against his will
simply because he is likely to be dangerous in the future, as
opposed to having actually been dangerous in the past.").
33 See, for example, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 7b
(West Supp. 1996); and WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(6)
(West Supp. 1996), which incorporate certain criminal offenses
into their definitions of the committable sex offender.
34 Although the Constitution requires an actus reus prior to
criminal prosecution or punishment, see LAFAVE & SCOTT,
supra note 12, at 195, the purpose underlying the 1939
Psychopathic Personality Commitment Act in Minnesota was to
enable the state to commit individuals before they commit
"horrifYing crimes." See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914
("[T]he compelling government interest [at stake] is the
protection of members of the public from persons who have an
uncontrollable impulse to sexually assault."); Francis, supra
note 2, at 145.
The legislative histories of sex offender commitment
statutes often specifY that the statutes are needed to compensate
for "shortcomings" in the criminal justice system, including
those caused by the double jeopardy prohibition and burden of
proof requirements. See McCaffrey, supra note 13, at 912
n.258; Psychopathic Personalities Subcommittee, Report, in
MINNESOTA DEPT. OF HUMAN SERVICES, REpORT TO THE
COMMISSIONER: COMMITMENT ACT TASK FORCE, at 45, 48-50
(1988) (Commitment law needed to protect the public against
"individuals . . . who may not have been convicted of a sex
offense, because of the reluctance of young and/or scared
victims to testifY against perpetrators of sexual abuse," because
of the "comparatively short correctional sentences" for sex
offenders, and to confine persons who "may be dangerous but
evade conviction due to the high burden of proof required in
criminal cases.").

35 See La Fond, supra note 1, at 671-77; Rideout, supra note
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14, at 784-89.
36 The stories of the victims are recounted in Boerner, supra
note 3, at 525-37; La Fond, supra note 1, at 671-80; Rideout,
supra note 14, at 784-89; and McCaffrey, supra note 13, at 887.
For stories of the rapists, many of whom also have been victims
in their lives, see Lawrence Wright, A Rapists Homecoming,
NEW YORKER, Sept. 1995, at 56; Conrad deFiebre, Linehan: I
Just Want to Live a Normal Life, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Aug. 29,
1994, at AI.

37 See La Fond, supra note 1, at 670-84 (describing the official
narrative that came to stand for the Washington State sex
offender commitment law).
38 See sources cited supra note 36.
39 Although sex offender commitment laws enjoy broad
support, they have not met with universal acceptance even
outside the legal community. See, for example, the following
newspaper opinion pieces, which question the legitimacy of sex
offender commitment legislation: Loophole-Closing a Mistake,
DULUTH NEWS-TRIB., Sept. 2, 1994, at 7A;
New Law
Endangers Constitutional Rights, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, Jan.
18, 1995, at 8A; Preventive Imprisonment, WASH. POST, Dec.
14, 1996, at A26; Terry Tang, Popular Result at the Cost of a
Dangerous Precedent, SEATTLE TIMES, Aug. 15, 1993, at B4.
40 My use of the terms "espoused rules" and "rules-in-use" is
largely based on CHRIS ARGYRIS & DONALD A. SCHON, THEORY
IN PRACTICE: INCREASING PROFESSIONAL EFFECTIVENESS (1974).
41 See id. at xiii-ix. Compare Argyris and Schon's discussion
of "espoused theories" and "theories in use." Id

42 As Lafond points out, "'every story is a reduction, a fiction,
made from a certain point of view.'" Lafond, supra note 1, at
672 (quoting JAMES BoYD WHITE, HERACLES' Bow: ESSAYS ON
THE RHETORIC AND POETICS OF THE LAW 174 (1985)). I suggest
a stronger use of the word "fiction." This is not the inevitable
fiction of reduction, of point of view. Rather, I am suggesting
that the story the high courts tell in the official narrative is not
representative of what really happens in the lower courts. The
official narratives are "made up" fiction, not reality observed
and described from a point of view. See Michael L. Perlin,
Pretexts and Mental Disability Law: The Case of Competency,
47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 625, 631 (l993) (discussing "legal
fictions" in mental health law).
43 The invisibility of the rules-in-use in sex offender
commitments has important consequences for litigators. I
explore these issues in Eric S. Janus, Defending Sex Offender
Commitments in Minnesota, in PSYCHOPATIlIC PERSONALITIES
AND SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS § 3 (1995).
44 In In re Young, 857 P.2d 989, the Washington Supreme
Court considered constitutional challenges to the sex-offender
commitment provisions of Washington's Community Protection
Act of 1990. Andre Young and Vance Cunningham were
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involuntarily committed to mental health facilities after juries
determined that they were "sexually violent predators." Id. at
992-93.
The supreme court reversed Cunningham's
commitment and affirmed in part and remanded Young's case.
Under Washington law, a person who is found to be a
"sexually violent predator" can be committed after he or she has
served a criminal sentence. The statute defines "sexually
violent predator" as a person "who has been convicted of or
charged with a crime of sexual violence and who suffers from a
mental abnormality or personality disorder which makes the
person likely to engage in predatory acts of sexual violence if
not confined in a secure facility." WASH. REv. CODE ANN. §
71.09.020(1) (West Supp. 1996).
A petition to commit Young was filed on October 24, 1990,
one day prior to his release for his most recent rape conviction.
In re Young, 857 P.2d at 994. He had been convicted of several
rapes, starting in 1962. After a hearing in 1991, a jury
concluded that Young was a "sexually violent predator." Id. at
995. The petition to commit Cunningham was also filed in
1990. The state filed the petition about four and one-half
months after Cunningham had completed his most recent prison
term for rape. Although Cunningham was only 26 years old
when the state filed the petition, his criminal history reached
back 10 years, including three rape convictions. Id. After a
hearing, a jury concluded that Cunningham was a "sexually
violent predator." !d. at 996.
Young and Cunningham challenged the statute on several
constitutional grounds. First, they claimed that the statute
violated ex post facto and double jeopardy protections. !d. at
992. Second, they raised issues of substantive due process.
Third, Young and Cunningham alleged procedural due process
violations. The court first held that neither the double jeopardy
nor the ex post facto clause is violated by the law, finding the
law to be civil, and not criminal, in nature, and its purpose
remedial rather than punitive. Id. at 999.
Addressing the substantive due process argument, the court
held that Washington had a compelIing interest in treating sex
predators and protecting society from them. Id. at 1000. In
addition, it found no substantive due process problem because
the statute allows civil commitment only after a finding of both
a mental disorder and dangerousness. However, these must be
proved by evidence of a recent overt act if the individual is not
incarcerated at the time of the petition.
The court found that the state did not afford equal protection
because the state did not require the consideration of less
restrictive alternatives for confinement of sex offenders
although it is required by Washington's mental health statute.
Thus, although the court affirmed the commitment for Young, it
remanded the decision to determine whether less restrictive
confinement was appropriate. As to the other issues, the court
held that a unanimous jury verdict was required, that the statute
was not vague, and that Young and Cunningham did not retain
the right to remain silent at their civil hearings.

45 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d 910, involved a challenge to
Minnesota's Psychopathic Personality Law. The Minnesota
Supreme Court held that the statute conformed to constitutional
requirements and upheld Blodgett's commitm~nt to a secure
mental health facility.
Minnesota law provides for the involuntary civil
commitment of any person found to be a "psychopathic
personality," defined as:
the existence in any person of such conditions of
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior,
or lack of customary standards of good judgment,
or failure to appreciate the consequences of personal
acts, or a combination of any of these conditions,
which render the person irresponsible for personal
conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person
has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct
in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control
the person's sexual impulses and, as a result, is
dangerous to other persons.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a (West Supp. 1996).
Blodgett, 28 years old at the time of this case, had a history
of sexual misconduct which began at the age of 16. Shortly
before his 1991 release date from prison, and after evaluation by
a psychologist, the state filed a petition for his commitment.
The trial court found that Blodgett was a psychopathic
personality, and committed him to the Minnesota Security
Hospital. Blodgett, 510 N.W. 2d at 912.
In his appeal to the Minnesota Supreme Court, Blodgett
raised two issues. First, Blodgett claimed that Minnesota's
statute violated his right to substantive due process. Second, he
claimed the statute violated his right to equal protection of the
laws under the Minnesota and U.S. Constitutions.
Blodgett pointed out that in Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S.
71 (1992), the U.S. Supreme Court stated that a state may
constitutionally:
(a) imprison a convicted criminal for
deterrence and retribution reasons; (b) confine persons who are
mentally iII and dangerous; and (c) in certain narrow cases,
subject persons who pose a danger to others or the community,
to limited pre-trial confinement. Blodgett, 510 N.W. 2d at 914.
Blodgett argued that he did not fit into any of these categories.
Relying on State ex rei. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309 U.S.
270,274 (1940), in which the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the
constitutionality of Minnesota's law, the Minnesota Supreme
Court decided that Foucha did not prohibit the commitment of
psychopathic personalities. The court further held that the State
had a legitimate interest in the safety of the community. In
addition, the court observed that Blodgett was entitled to release
if his conduct was brought under control, which appeared to
satisfy the requirements of Foucha.
Blodgett also argued that to deny sexual predators their
liberty while other dangerous people, not considered mentally
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ill, were set free, violated equal protection. Blodgett, 510 N.W.
2d at 917. The court dismissed this argument, noting the special
danger, particularly to women and children, posed by sexual
predators. Finally, the court reiterated the State's compelling
interest in public safety which, when considered in light of the
imperfect state of medical and scientific knowledge concerning
the motivations behind the conduct of sex offenders, provided a
sufficient justification for any unequal burden imposed by the
law. Id. at 918.
46 In Post, 541 N.W.2d 115, the State of Wisconsin appealed a
trial court decision holding its "sexually violent person" statute
unconstitutional. While the statute was challenged on grounds
of double jeopardy, ex post facto laws, substantive due process,
equal protection, and whether the governor's partial veto created
a law which is incomplete and unworkable as applied to the
state's Sex Crimes Act, this court dealt with only the last three
issues. The court determined the double jeopardy and ex post
facto issues in a companion case decided the same day. See
Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105.
The Wisconsin statute in question provides for the
commitment of persons adjudicated "sexually violent persons"
until the person no longer falls under this classification. WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 980.06(1) (West Supp. 1995). A "sexually
violent person" is defined as someone who has been convicted
of a sexually violent offense ... and who is dangerous because
he or she suffers from a mental disorder that makes it
substantially probable that the person will engage in acts of
sexual violence." Id. § 980.01(7).
Samuel E. Post had been confined to the Mendota Health
Institute following several convictions of sexual assault. Post,
541 N.W.2d at 119. Ben R. Oldakowski also had been confined
to Mendota after several sexual assaults involving kidnapping
and other charges of assault and exposing himself. The State
Department of Justice filed petitions to commit Post and
Oldakowski as sexually violent persons on July 12, 1994, three
days before their scheduled releases. The trial court found
probable cause to believe that both men were sexually violent
persons and ordered them confined to Mendota.
Post and Oldakowski filed motions to dismiss the
commitment, alleging the unconstitutionality of the Wisconsin
statute. The trial court held that the statute violated double
jeopardy and ex post facto laws, substantive due process, and
the equal protection clause. Id. at 119-120. Thus, the trial court
ordered the release of Post and Oldakowski.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the statute did not
violate substantive due process. Id. at 122. It found a
compelling state interest in protecting the public from those who
are a threat to the safety of the community. It also found that
the statute was narrowly tailored to meet that interest because it
allowed commitment of only the most dangerous sex
offenders-"those whose mental condition predisposes them to
reoffend." /d. at 124. The court also rejected the argument that
the statute's definition of "dangerousness" was an
impermissibly low standard of "substantial risk." /d. at 126.

90

Post and Oldakowski also argued that the "sexually violent
person" statute violated equal protection because it treated
persons differently than under chapter 51 of the Wisconsin
statutes for initial commitment for people with mental illnesses.
Id. at 128. The court did not decide on a level of scrutiny to use
because it found that all but one of the differences challenged
passed strict scrutiny. Id. at 130. The court again found that the
state had a compelling interest in protecting the public from
sexually violent persons who are likely to commit future sex
crimes.
In addition, the court found that the distinction between
dangerous and non-dangerous mentally ill persons is a sufficient
reason for determining the type of care to be given. The court
held that communities, through their elected representatives, can
choose how to resolve their social problems in more than one
way, as long as the solution is constitutional. Id. Since the
question in equal protection cases is whether the government
has an appropriate interest furthered by the differential
treatment, the court found that treating violent sex criminals
differently was constitutionally justified, as they pose a greater
threat to the community.
In Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d 105, the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin upheld the constitutionality of its "sexually violent
person" statute. See WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980 (West Supp. 1995).
In Carpenter, the court dealt with only the Ex Post Facto and
Double Jeopardy Clauses of the Wisconsin and U.S.
Constitutions.
The State of Wisconsin filed a petition to commit Carpenter
in 1994 after he had served prison sentences for sexual assaults
on minors. Carpenter, 541 N.W.2d at 108. Schmidt had also
been incarcerated for sexual assaults on minors when the state
filed a petition against him. The trial courts found that the
statute violated the Ex Post Facto, Double Jeopardy, and
Substantive Due Process Clauses of the Wisconsin and U.S.
Constitutions. /d.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court first held that there was not a
double jeopardy violation. A statute violates double jeopardy if
its principal purpose is punishment, retribution, or deterrence.
/d. at 109-10 (citing State v. Killebrew, 340 N.W.2d 470, 475
(Wis. 1983». Here, the court held that Carpenter and Schmidt
failed to show that the statute had the principal purpose of
punishment, or that it had the sufficient criminal characteristics
such that it could be considered punishment. Carpenter, 541
N.W.2d at 113. Much like the double jeopardy analysis, the
court found no violation of ex post facto laws, because the
purpose of the "sexually violent person" statute was not
punitive, but, rather, to protect the public by providing
treatment for sex offenders.
47 The misuses of psychiatry as social control evoke
frightening images.
See, e.g., ANTHONY BURGESS, A
CLOCKWORK ORANGE (1st rev. ed. 1988); Erlinder, supra note
12, at 159 (likening Minnesota's system of psychopathic
personality commitment to a "gulag").
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48 The principle of criminal interstitiality limits civil
commitments to legitimate state interests that cannot be
vindicated by use of the criminal law. The State, for example,
has a legitimate interest in controlling dangerous individuals
who are not criminally responsible. It also has a legitimate
interest in protecting individuals who are incompetent to protect
themselves. Neither of these interests is addressable by the
criminal law. See infra Part II.C.

49 See supra note 36, discussing the narrative origins of the
various laws.

50 Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 911-12; Young, 857 P.2d at 99497; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 119-20.
The "past crime" and "likelihood of future harm"
requirements are incorporated into the language of the statutes.
Minnesota's law illustrates this, defining "sexually dangerous
person" as a person who:
(1) has engaged in a course of harmful sexual
conduct ... ;

All three states claim that sex offender commitments are
limited to the "most dangerous." See Kirwin, supra note 3, at
24; OFFICE OF THE ArroRNEY GEN., STATE OF MINNESOTA,
TEsTIMONY OF ArrORNEY GENERAL HUBERT HUMPHREY III
BEFORE THE LEGISLATIVE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL PREDATORS:
PROPOSED SEXUAL PREDATOR REFORMS (AUGUST 11, 1994), 1
("[H]ow do we protect the public from some of the most
dangerous criminals in society?"). The Minnesota Supreme
Court held that sex offender commitments must be limited to
those who are "highly likely" to be violent, though the statute
itself only requires a showing that violence is "likely." In re
Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd.
18b. The Washington Supreme Court construed the statutory
term "likely" to refer only to persons whose "likelihood of reoffense is extremely high." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1003. The
Wisconsin statute requires proof of a "substantial probability"
of future sexual violence. In upholding the statute against
constitutional attack, the Wisconsin Supreme Court described
the commitment group as those who are "most likely" to engage
in sexual violence, "distinctively dangerous," and "only of the
most dangerous of sexual offenders." Post, 541 N.W.2d at 118,
124,130.

(2) has manifested a sexual, personality, or other
mental disorder or dysfunction; and

55 See Cooper v. Oklahoma, 116 S. Ct. 1373 (1996).

(3) as a result, is likely to engage in acts of harmful
sexual conduct.

56 Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 25, at 449 ("mental status"
terms in the law serve "discriminative" functions).

MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18b (sexually dangerous
person); see also WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1)
(sexually violent predator); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(7)
(sexually violent person).

57 Id. ("mental status" terms in the law serve '1ustificatory"
functions).

51 See Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914; Young, 857 P.2d at 1000;
Post, 541 N.W.2d at 129.

52 The courts in all three decisions either state or suggest that
sex offender commitments are narrowly tailored to meet the
compelling interest of protecting against sexual violence. See
Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15; Young, 857 P.2d at 1006;
Post, :;41 N.W.2d at 124.

53 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914 n.5; In re Young,
857 P.2d at 1005-07; see also Post, 541 N.W.2d at 126. In
Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, the U.S. Supreme Court held
that a Louisiana civil commitment statute, which allowed an
insanity 'acquittee, who had an antisocial personality disorder
but no longer a mental illness, to remain indefinitely committed
to a mental hospital on the basis of dangerousness alone,
violated substantive due process.
54 An influential writer on preventive detention suggests that
the l1!ajor legitimizing principle should be the principle of
proportionality, where the nature of the confinement would be
tied to the severity of the danger posed by the individual. Alan
M. Dershowitz, Preventive Confinement:
A Suggested
Framework/or Constitutional AnalysiS, 51 TEx. L. REv. 1277,
1371 (1974).

58 The Washington Supreme Court's story in this regard reads
as follows:
Here, petitioners Young and Cunningham were
diagnosed with a mental disorder and share a
lengthy criminal history of violent rape. Other
individuals encompassed under the commitment law
share similar profiles. In such circumstances, the
Court has consistently upheld civil commitment
schemes.

In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 at 1001 (citing Addington v. Texas,
441 U.S. at 426). The Minnesota Supreme Court explains:
Mental illness is simply that, an illness, and should
be treated po differently than other illnesses and
with due respect for personal liberties. When,
however, a person is both "mentally ill and
dangerous to the public," our legislature has
provided for commitment to the state security
hospital. In like measure, and with like concern, our
legislature has provided for commitment of the
"psychopathic personality" who, because of an
uncontrollable sexual impulse, is dangerous to the
public.

In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15 (citation omitted).
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59 See ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-4601; CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 6600(a), (c) (West Supp. 1996); IOWA CODE ANN. §
709C.2, subd. 4 (West Supp. 1996); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5929a02(a) (1994); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18b;
WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(1); WIS. STAT. ANN. §
980.01(7); see also BRAKELET AL., supra note 1, at 740; Kirwin,
supra note 3, at 24. It is not clear that civil commitment statutes
need to require a showing of past overt acts. See BRAKEL ET AL.,
supra note I, at 35-36.

"Mad" and "Bad"-A Study of Minnesota's Sexual
Psychopathic Personality Statute, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS
& PUB. POL'y 227, 259-64 (1996) (exploring the madlbad
dichotomy).

63 The Washington legislation discusses this explicitly. WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020(2) (West 1992). The differences
are the focus of the Kansas Supreme Court's discussion of its
sex offender commitment statute. See In re Hendricks, 912 P.2d
at 135.

60 Minnesota defines "sexual psychopathic personality" as
the existence in any person of such conditions of
emotional instability, or impulsiveness of behavior,
or lack of customary standards of good judgment, or
failure to appreciate the consequences of personal
acts, or a combination of any of these conditions,
which render the person irresponsible for personal
conduct with respect to sexual matters, if the person
has evidenced, by a habitual course of misconduct
in sexual matters, an utter lack of power to control
the person's sexual impulses and, as a result, is
dangerous to other persons.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 18a.

61 See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 6600(a), (c);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 709C.2, subd. 4; KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 59-29a02(a); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd.
18b (referring, without further elaboration, to a
"sexual personality, or other mental disorder or
dysfunction"); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 71.09.020
(defining "abnormality" as a "congenital or acquired
condition affecting the emotional or volitional
capacity which predisposes the person to the
commission of criminal sexual acts in a degree
constituting such person a menace to the health and
safety of others").
Despite the "mental disorder" requirement, it is generally
acknowledged that sex offenders are not susceptible to standard
civil commitment methods. For example:
[The Washington] legislature finds that a small but
extremely dangerous group of sexually violent
predators exist who do not have a mental disease or
defect that renders them appropriate for the existing
involuntary treatment act, chapter 71.05 RCW,
which is intended to be a short-term civil
commitment system that is primarily designed to
provide short-term treatment to individuals with
serious mental disorders ....

Id. § 71.09.010 (West 1992).
62 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915-16; In re Young, 857
P.2d at 1001-03; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-23; Katherine P.
Blakey, Note, The Indefinite Civil Commitment of Dangerous
Sex Offenders is an Appropriate Legal Compromise Between

92

64 See MARTHA MINow, MAKING ALL THE DIFFERENCE:
INCLUSION, EXCLUSION AND AMERICAN LAW 49-78 (1990).
65 See STUART A. KIRK & HERB KUTCHINS, THE SELLING OF
DSM: THE RHETORIC OF SCIENCE IN PSYCHIATRY 21 (1992)
(describing the view taken by "many sociologists" that "mental
illness was merely another instance of how society labels and
controls those who behave badly"). This concern is the main
theme of most of the articles that are critical of sex offender
commitments. See. e.g.• Lisa T. Greenlees, Washington State's
Sexually Violent Predators Act: Model or Mistake?, 29 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 107, 130 (1991) (arguing that vague definitions
allow those who should not be committed to slip through the
cracks); Lafond, supra note 1, at 658 (demonstrating the
Washington Legislature "deliberately chose to abuse" the
medical model of civil commitment); Wettstein, supra note 25,
at 603.
66 The undesirable consequences of the manipulability of
psychiatric labels would be magnified in the sex offender
commitment context compared to the standard civil commitment
context. In the standard civil commitment setting, as envisioned
by the Supreme Court in Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418
(1978), there is a layered review to catch mistakes in the
commitment process. /d. at 428-29. In the sex offender
commitment context, in contrast, there are layered impediments
to review, which magnify "mistakes" in the initial commitment
process, See Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence, supra note 23,
at 195-206.
67 The Washington court addressed the issue by stating
"psychiatric and psychological clinicians who testify in good
faith as to mental abnormality are able to identify sexual
pathologies that are as real and meaningful as other pathologies
already listed in the DSM." In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1001.
Minnesota's assurance is equally as conclusory: "Whatever the
explanation or label, the 'psychopathic personality' is an
identifiable and documentable violent sexually deviant
condition or disorder." In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. The
Wisconsin court addresses this issue as follows:
In support of its argument that a "mental disorder"
cannot be a sufficient condition for commitment, the
dissent cites testimony that "mental disorders are the
broad big umbrella that all of us could fall under."
On the contrary, the DSM-IV states that a diagnosis
of "disorder" is only appropriate when a
manifestation of dysfunction crosses the "boundary
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between normality and pathology." The DSM-IV
acknowledges that "no definition adequately
specifies precise boundaries for the concept of
'mental disorder.'" However, a mental disorder is
"conceptualized as a clinically significant behavioral
or psychological syndrome or pattern that occurs in
an individual" and must reflect a current state of
distress, impaired functioning or significant risk of
pain, death or loss of freedom. Disorders do not
include merely deviant behaviors that conflict with
prevailing societal mores.

Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123.
68 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 914-15; In re Young, 857
P.2d at 1001-03; Post, 541 N.W.2d at 122-24. This approach
has been criticized by the Supreme Court of Kansas. See In re
Hendricks, 912 P.2d at 135.
69 See Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123-24; Jerome C. Wakefield, The
Concept of Mental Disorder: On the Boundary Between
Biological Facts and Social Values, 47 AM. PSYCHOL. 373
(1992) [hereinafter Wakefield, Concept of Mental Disorder];
Jerome C. Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction: A
Conceptual Critique of DSM-IlI-R's Definition of Mental
Disorder, 99 PSYCHOL. REv. 232 (1992) [hereinafter Wakefield,
Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction] (discussing difficulties in
defining "mental disorder").
70 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 ("The psychopathic
personality statute identifies a volitional dysfunction which
grossly impairs judgment and behavior with respect to the sex
drive. Cf. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02, subd. 13 (West 1992
[defining 'mentally ill person']").

71 The court ignores a huge literature on the subject of
"volition." See, e.g., HERBERT FINGARETIE & ANN FINGARETIE
HAsSE, MENTAL DISABILITIES AND CRIMINAL REsPONSmILITY
(1979); ROBERT F. SCHOPP, AUTOMATISM, INSANITY, AND THE
PSYCHOLOGY OF CRIMINAL REsPONSmILITY (1991); Seymour L.
Halleck, Which Patients Are Responsible for Their Illnesses?,
42 AM. 1. PSYCHOTHERAPY 338 (1988); Stephen 1. Morse,
Culpability and Control, 142 U. PENN. L. REv. 1587 (1994).
In fact, the author of the court's opinion ignored his own
dictum from a previous case:
[T]here is no practical way of distinguishing
between an uncontrollable and a controllable
impUlse. Because an impulse has not been resisted
does not always mean that it could not have been ...
. The irresistible impulse test leaves too much to
conjecture and unverifiable theorizing ....
State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Wicka, 474 N.W.2d 323, 334
(Minn. 1991) (Simonett, J., dissenting).
The court cites two social science references on the issue of
mental disorder. But neither reference touches on the issue of

"volitional dysfunction" even tangentially. See In re Blodgett,
910 N.W.2d at 915 n.7 ("The manual indicates that the
antisocial personality disorder may at times be characterized by
sexual promiscuity.") (citing AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N,
DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
342-46 (3d ed. rev. 1987)); id. at 915 n.8 ('''Sexual offenders
have been found to present distorted and disturbed thought
processes . . . .",) (quoting Margit Henderson & Seth
Kalichman, Sexually Deviant Behavior and Schizotypy: A
Theoretical Perspective with Supportive Data, PSYCHIATRIC Q.,
Winter 1990, at 281).
72 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. Here -the court's
terminology seems imprecise. See Park E. Dietz, Sex Offenses:
Behavioral Aspects, in 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE
1485 (Sanford H. Kadish ed., 1983) (asserting that some sexual
crimes result from sexual deviancy, and some are the product of
sexual "normalcy" combined with antisocial behaviors). Does
the Court here mean to restrict the term "psychopathic
personality" to those who have a "sexual deviancy" in addition
to a "volitional dysfunction"?

73 In re Young, 857 P.2d 989 at 1001. This approach has been
criticized by the Supreme Court of Kansas. See In re Hendricks,
912 P.2d at 135.

74 See Vernon L. Quinsey, The Prediction and Explanation of
Criminal Violence, 18 INT'L J.L. & PSYCHIATRY 117 (1995)
(discussing whether psychopathic personality is a real disorder);
see generally Wakefield, Concept of Mental Disorder, supra
note 69; Wakefield, Disorder as Harmful Dysfunction, supra
note 69; see also KIRK & KUTCHINS, supra note 65, at 28-30
(discussing the problems of diagnostic validity in the DSM-III);
Allen Frances, The DSM-III Personality Disorders Section: A
Commentary, 137 AM. 1. PSYCHIATRY 1050, 1050 (1980)
("[p]ersonality disorders are not at all clearly distinct from
normal functioning or from each other."); R. Rogers et aI.,
Diagnostic Validity of Antisocial Personality Disorders, 16 L.
& HUMAN BEHAv. 677 (1992); Thomas A. Widiger & Timothy
J. Trull, Personality Disorders and Violence, in VIOLENCE AND
MENTAL DISORDER: DEVELOPMENTS IN RISK ASSESSMENT 203
(John Monahan & Henry J. Steadman eds., 1994) ("DSM III-R
is a dichotomous model that imposes arbitrary categorical
distinctions between the presence and absence of a disorder that
may have little relationship to the predictability of violent
behavior.
The diagnostic categories are substantially
heterogeneous with respect to the personality variables that are
most likely to be predictive of violent behavior."); James S.
Wulach, Diagnosing the DSM-III Antisocial Personality
Disorder, 14 PROF. PSYCHOL. REs. & PRAC. 330 (1983)
(questioning validity of Antisocial Personality Disorder
diagnosis).
75 See SCHOPP, supra note 7i; Schopp & Sturgis, supra note
25, at 449 (observing that "mental status" terms in the law serve
"discriminative" and '1ustificatory" functions); see generally
sources cited supra note 73 and accompanying text.
76 Part V of this article assesses the Minnesota mental
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disability element for its ability to perform this discriminative
task.
77 See Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 25.

78 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note II (observing that criminal,
though not civil, confinement is premised on culpability, and
advocating the proposition that civil commitment should "pick
up the slack" to protect the public from dangerous offenders
who are not reached by the criminal justice system).
79 For fuller discussion of this principle, see generally Eric S.
Janus, Preventing Sexual Violence:
Setting Principled
Constitutional Boundaries on Sex Offender Commitments, 72
IND. L.J. 157 (1996); SCHOPP, supra note 71; Schopp & Sturgis,
supra note 25; Winick, supra note 25; Blakey, supra note 62.

80 See Janus, supra note 79.
81 See Addington, 441 U.S. at 428 ("'moral force of the
criminal law"') (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364
(1970)).

82 See MICHAEL L. PERLIN, 3 MENTAL DISABILIlY LAW § 15.02
(1989) (recounting the historical bases of the insanity defense);
Stephen 1. Morse, Causation, Compulsion, and Involuntariness,
22 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY LAW 159 (1994); Robinson,
supra note 11 (discussing how this legitimizes the criminal law).
83 There are other inherent, "substantive" limits on the reach of
the criminal law. For example, the criminal law, which operates
retrospectively on individuals, may not be able to deal
effectively with the threat of epidemic. Thus, non-criminal
confinement may be acceptable in some situations to address
epidemic disease. See Eric S. Janus, Aids and the Law: Setting
and Evaluating Threshold Standards for Coercive Public
Health Interventions, 14 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 503, 505
(1988).
84 The principle of interstitiality underlies all non-criminal
forms of incarceration. Very briefly, there are four maj or forms
of non-criminal incarceration. Parens patriae commitments
address the incapacity of an individual to act in his or her best
interests, and thus address non-criminal harm.
Insanity
acquitees are committable because their behavior is
substantively beyond the reach of the criminal law. As a
regulatory measure, pre-trial detainees may be held based on
their future dangerousness because, by definition, criminal
sanctions are unavailable prior to trial. See United States v.
Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987). Quarantine laws are addressed to
epidemics, a threat of a different order than individual crimes;
because epidemics grow exponentially and threaten entire
populations, the harm is beyond the reach of post-behavior
criminal sanctions. See Janus, supra note 83.
The principle of interstitiality is consistent with
the result and the key language of Foucha v.
Louisiana, 504 U.S. at 82:

94

[T]he State does not explain why its interest would
not be vindicated by the ordinary criminal processes
involving charge and conviction, the use of
enhanced sentences for recidivists, and other
permissible ways of dealing with patterns of
criminal conduct. These are the normal means of
dealing with persistent criminal conduct.
85 There are other, less persuasive narratives the courts could
have adopted in an attempt to legitimize sex offender
commitments. They could have adopted a ''jurisprudence of
prevention" theme, see Richards, supra note 6, in which it is the
strength of the state's interest in countering sexual violence
which alone suffices to justifY a "regulatory" taking of the
individual's liberty.
This theme entails the principle of
proportionality, alluded to supra note 52. All of the courts
clearly reject this story.
Second, the courts could have invoked a parens patriae
justification for sex offender commitments. This would have
involved characterizing sex offenders as incompetent, in the
sense of being unable to care for themselves. The parens patriae
justification can be viewed as a subset of the principle of
interstitiality, in the sense that the "self-protection" role of
parens patriae commitments is beyond the reach of the criminal
justice system. The Washington and Wisconsin courts both
mention the parens patriae interest, but do not develop it. In
particular, neither court attempts to characterize the mental
disorder element as fitting into a parens patriae theory.
Compare Allen v. Illinois, 478 U.S. 364 (1986), where the
parens patriae assumption seems to be a key assumption the
U.S. Supreme Court makes in describing Illinois' sex offender
commitment statute.
Finally, the courts could have adopted a narrative of
difference, in which the state's right to invoke non-criminal
incarceration arises not from an enhanced interest of the state,
but from a set of rights that are diminished because of the
individuals' membership in a "degraded" class or category. Cf
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927). Though none of the courts
openly espoused such a narrative, its seeds are liberally
scattered throughout the cases on sex offender commitments. I
discuss this issue in more detail in Eric S. Janus, Toward a
Conceptual Framework for Assessing Police Power
Commitment Legislation, 76 NEB. L. REv. (forthcoming 1997).
86 The classic articulation is found in Developments - Civil
Commitment, supra note 21. Citing Pearson, 287 N.W. 297,
303 (Minn. 1939), this article notes that "police power
commitment standards would appear to be unconstitutionally
overbroad unless mental illness is interpreted to mean a
condition which induces substantially diminished criminal
responsibility." Developments - Civil Commitment, supra note
21, at 1233-34. "Criminal irresponsibility" would be defined
"in terms of inability to control one's conduct." Id. at 1235; see
also Joseph M. Livermore et aI., On the Justifications for Civil
Commitment, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 75, 86 (1968); Note,
Standards of Mental Illness in the Insanity Defense and Police
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Power Commitments: A Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 60
MINN. L. REv. 1289, 1298 (1976) (police power commitments
justified by inability to control behavior); Stephen J. Morse, A
Preforence for Liberty:
The Case Against Involuntary
Commitment of the Mentally Disordered, 70 CAL. L. REv. 54,
59 (1982) ("The primary theoretical reason for allowing
involuntary commitment of only the mentally disordered is the
belief that their legally relevant behavior is the inexorable
product of uncontrollable disorder, whereas the legally relevant
behavior of a normal p'erson is the product of free choice. . . .
Because the individual will ultimately have little or no choice in
deciding whether to act violently, it does not violate the
disordered person's dignity or autonomy to hospitalize him or
her preventively, even in the absence of strong predictive
evidence of future dangerousness.").

psychopathic personality or the fact that a person is a sexually
dangerous person shall not in any case constitute a defense to a
charge of crime, nor relieve such person from liability to be
tried upon a criminal charge." MINN. STAT. ANN. §253B.185,
subd.3.

The contemporary scholarship confirms this pedigree. See
SCHOPP, supra note 71; Marie A. Bochnewich, Comment,
Prediction of Dangerousness and Washington's Sexually
Violent Predator Statute, 29 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 277, 305
(1992) (Sex offender commitment is justified because it is
directed only against those sex offenders who "are less
blameworthy because they are less capable of exercising self
control." "[T]hese uncontrolled, impulsive sex offenders ... are
'least deserving of punishment. "'); Winick, supra note 25, at
538 ("[F]or the purpose of commitment to a psychiatric
hospital, a condition must be capable of so impairing
functioning that the individual is unable to engage in rational
decision making or to control his or her behavior.")

101 287 N.W. at 303.

87 The law was supplemented in 1994 with the Sexually
Dangerous Persons (SDP) Act. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 253B.02,
subd. 18b. See supra note 50 for the statute's definition of
"sexually dangerous person." Both laws contain "past act" and
"dangerousness" requirements. The SDP Act differs from
Minnesota's psychopathic personality law, see supra note 58, in
that "it is not necessary [for purposes of the SDP Act] to prove
that the person has an inability to control the person's sexual
impulses." § 253B.02, subd. 18b.
88 Pearson, 287 N.W. at 303.

89 Id. at 302.
90 !d.

96 State v. Rawland, 199 N.W.2d 774, 788 (Minn. 1?72)
(emphasis added).

97 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 917.

98 !d. at 918.
99 !d. at 918, n.16, citing Robinson, supra note 11, at 716.
100 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918.

102 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 912.

103 The court characterizes the "utter lack of power to
control" element as a "finding," presumably a finding of fact.
!d. Several months later, in In re Linehan, the court recognized
that the "utter lack of power to control" test should be reviewed
de novo as a question oflaw. 518 N.W.2d at 613.
104 Robert F. Schopp, Sexual Predators and the Structure of
the Mental Health System: Expanding the Normative Focus of
Therapeutic Jurisprudence, 1 PSYCHOL. PuB. POL'y & L. 161,
161 (1995). Schopp also notes that the Minnesota Supreme
Court "did not question the convictions or prison sentences" of
those who had been committed. Id. While this is technically
correct, it does not acknowledge that the court construed the
question before it as a facial, rather than as applied, challenge.
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915. Thus, as pointed out in the
text, the court had no opportunity to question the applicability
of a (properly construed) "utter lack of power to control" test to
a person who, like Blodgett, had been held criminally
responsible.
The distinction is important.
Schopp's
characterization might be read to suggest that the court held that
the ''utter lack of power to control" test could properly include
criminally responsible individuals, whereas the more
conservative interpretation of the court's opinion is that it
avoided the issue altogether.
105 Blakey, supra note 62, at 263.

91 Id.

106 Pearson, 309 U.S. at 274.

92Id.

93 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915.
94 See Paul H. Robinson, 1 CRlMINALLAWDEFENSES § 173(c)
(1st ed. 1984); Schopp & Sturgis, supra note 25, at 446; see
generally SCHOPP, supra note 71; Blakey, supra note 62; Morse,
supra note 71.
95 Pearson, 287 N.W. at 303. Minnesota's law provides that
"[t]he existence in any person of a condition of sexual

107 Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 514 (4th Cir. 1964)
(noting that the statute was "carefully drawn to conform to the
[Pearson]
definition,"
and
therefore
not
facially
unconstitutional, but "may be fraught with the possibility of
abuse in that if not administered in the spirit in which it is
conceived it can become a mere device for warehousing the
obnoxious and antisocial elements of society"); Director v.
Daniels, 221 A.2d 397, 409 (Md. Ct. App. 1966)
(constitutionality of the Maryland statute saved by construction
requiring a "psychiatric disorder manifested by . . . an
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uncontrollable desire . . . which is uncontrollable by the
individual"); State v. Mandary, 178 Neb. 383, 396 (1965)
(Nebraska's sex offender statute mandates commitment and
treatment for those "likely to attack or otherwise inflict injury"
as a result of "uncontrolled and uncontrollable desires").

equals lack of criminal responsibility. It is sufficient to point
out that the Wisconsin court used the notion of behaviors
"caused by" a disorder to make its argument more persuasive,
evoking an image of human behaviors that de-emphasizes free
will and human behavioral agency. /d. at 159.

108 Millard, 406 F.2d at 969.

121 Courts often acknowledge the importance of maintaining
the moral legitimacy of the criminal law. See, e.g., In re
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (discussing "moral force" of
the criminal law); In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 918 ("moral
credibility of the criminal justice system" at stake).

109 Linehan 1,518 N.W.2d at 615 (Gardebring, 1., dissenting).
110 In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1002 (emphasis added).
III The court's account of the dynamics of rape is remarkably
similar to Professor Morse's prescription for the volitional
excuse. See Stephen J. Morse, Excusing the Crazy: The
Insanity Defense Reconsidered, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. 777, 820
(1985).
112 See In re Young, 857 P.2d at 1000-03 (citing Brooks,
supra note 4, at 733).

122 Linehan L 518 N.W.2d 609.
123 Erickson, Psychopathic Personality Statute, supra note I.
124 Dittrich v. Brown County, 9 N.W.2d 510, 511 (Minn.
1943).
125 See Erickson, Northern Lights, supra note 1, at 3; see also
In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 910 (Wahl, J., dissenting).

I 13 Brooks, supra note 4, at 732.
114 Id. at 730 (emphasis added).
115 In re Young, 857 P.2d at 998 (citing Bochnewich, supra
note 86, at 278).
116 Bochnewich, supra note 86, at 305.
117 Post, 541 N.W.2d at 123 (quoting DSM-IV, supra note 30,
at xxi).
118 WIS. STAT. ANN. § 980.01(2) (emphasis added).
119 Post, 541 N.W.2d at 124 (emphasis added).
120 Some prominent tests of criminal responsibility tum on
the presence or absence of such causation. The American Law
Institute adopted the following language: "A person is not
responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct
as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial
capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of
his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirements of
law." MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962) (emphasis added).
Chief Judge Bazelon held in Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d
862,874-75 (D.C. Cir. 1954), "that an accused is not criminally
responsible ifhis unlawful act was the product of mental disease
or mental defect" (emphasis added). Cf John Q. La Fond,
Washington's Sexually Violent Predators Statute: Law or
Lottery? A Response to Professor Brooks, 15 U. PUGET SOUND
L. REv. 755, 767 (arguing that "mental illness assumes there is a
causative defect in cognitive, emotional, or volitional processes
that can be diagnosed and, in most cases, treated" and that
absence of this "defect" in sex offender commitment cases is
fatal).
There is no need to engage here in a discussion of causality
and its relationship to criminal responsibility. See Morse, supra
note 86, for a cogent debunking of the notion that "causation"

96

126 See Millard, 406 F.2d at 966 ("The Sexual Psychopath
Act was enacted in 1948 as a 'humane and practical approach to
the problem of persons unable to control their sexual
emotions."') (quoting SENATE COMM. ON TIIE DISlRICT OF
COLUMBIA, PROVIDING FOR TIIE TREATMENT OF SEXUAL
PSYCHOPATIIS IN TIIE DISlRICT OF COLUMBIA, S. REp. No. 801377, at 5 (1948)); Erickson, Northern Lights, supra note 1, at 3
("Despite the emphasis on dangerousness in Minnesota's
Psychopathic Personality statute, persons committed under it in
the first decade were mostly window peepers, teenagers who
masturbated excessively or had sexual contact with animals,
consenting adult homosexuals, or non-violent pedophiles.");
John Pratt, Governing the Dangerous: An Historical Overview
of Dangerous Offender Legislation, 5 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 21,
26-27 (1996) (discussing the treatment of homosexuality in
"dangerous persons" statutes).
127 Cf Chief Judge Bazelon's lengthy analysis of the D.C.
Sexual Psychopath Act, which was modeled on the Minnesota
Act upheld in Pearson, 309 U.S. 270. Bazelon characterized
the proper subjects for commitment under the act as those "too
sick to deserve punishment." Millard, 406 F.2d at 969.
128 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 22. According to the
Minnesota Department of Human Services, admissions under
Minnesota's psychopathic personality statute declined as
follows:
1940's

1950's

1960's

1970's

1980's

141

85

32

18

14

Facsimile transmiSSion from Mmnesota Security Hospital,
Number of Men Admitted as Psychopathic Personalities (Oct.
17, 1995) [hereinafter MSH Fax] (on file with author).
129 In re Joelson, 385 N.W.2d 810 (Minn. 1986); Enebak v.
Noot, 353 N.W.2d 544 (Minn. 1984); In re Joelson, 344
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N.W.2d 613 (Minn. 1984); Bailey v. Noot, 324 N.W.2d 164
(Minn. 1982); In re K.B.C., 308 N.W.2d 495 (Minn. 1979);
Keiser v. Sheppard, 194 N.W.2d 286 (Minn. 1972). During the
same period, the Minnesota Court of Appeals also decided six
cases. In re Clements, 440 N.W.2d 133 (Minn. ct. App. 1989);
In re Clements, No. CX-88-1058, 1988 Minn. App. LEXIS 654
(Minn. Ct. App. July 27, 1988); Bailey v. Gardebring, No. C887-1839, 1988 WL 19366 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 1988); In re
Brown, 414 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987); In re Stone,
376 N.W.2d 511 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985); In re Martenies, 350
N.W.2d 470 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
130 440 N.W.2d 133. In that case the court alluded to the
standard, but reviewed compliance with the standard using an
error-of-fact, deferential review. Id. at 136 ("When evidence as
to the existence of a psychopathic personality is in conflict, the
question is one of fact to be determined by the trial court upon
all the evidence.") (citing In re Martenies, 350 N.W.2d at 472).
131 PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFFICE OF THE LEGIS.
AUDITOR
(MINNESOTA),
PSYCHOPATIllC
PERSONALITY
COMMITMENT LAW 1 (Feb. 1994). From January 1990 through
August, 1995, 100 people were admitted under Minnesota's sex
offender commitment laws. Conrad deFiebre, Psychopathic Sex
Offenders Get New Home, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRm., Nov. 5,
1995, at IB; MSH Fax, supra note 128.

alone.
See Edward P. Richards, The Jurisprudence of
Prevention:
The Right of Societal Self-Defense Against
Dangerous Individuals, 16 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 329 (1989).
In this doctrinal climate, the State of Louisiana could argue in
Foucha that dangerousness alone could justify civil
commitment. See Brief of Respondent, Foucha v. Louisiana,
504 U.S. 71 (1992) (No. 90-5844). In such a climate, the "utter
lack of power to control" test would indeed seem like archaic
surplusage. See Janus, supra note 79, at 179.
136 . See In re Walton, No. C9-92-1749, 1992 WL 383448
(Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 1992); In re Rickmyer, No. C4-92489, 1992 WL 174676 (Minn. Ct. App. July 28, 1992); In re
Nicolaison, No. CI-92-613, 1992 WL 160843 (Minn. Ct. App.
July 14, 1992); In re Reeves, No. C5-91-1589, 1991 WL
271528 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 1991); In re Hubbard, No. C991-1031,1991 WL 191651 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 1, 1991); In re
Devillion, No. C8-91-1070, 1991 WL 191653 (Minn. Ct. App.
Oct. 1, 1991); In re Thomas, No. C2-90-1863, 1990 WL
204264 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 1990); In re Martenies, No.
CX-94-90-1545, 1990 WL 152685 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 16,
1990).

137 See in re Hendrickson, No. C6-92-1790, 1992 WL
383446, at *2 (Minn. App. Dec. 29, 1992); In re Holly, No.
C9-92-1055, 1992 WL 238360, at *2 (Minn. App. Sept. 29,
1992»; In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 642.

132 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 22.
133 Id. at 25 ("Under the current system, civil commitment is
applied only to the relatively few, most dangerous, sexual
predators."); Hearings, supra note 54, at 1 (testimony of
Attorney General Humphrey) ("[H]ow do we protect the public
from some of the most dangerous criminals in society?").
134 For example, in Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d 609, a sex
offender commitment case in which I was involved as a defense
lawyer, the State's attorneys tried the case without mentioning
the Pearson "utter lack of power to control" standard. The
State's chief attorney was a criminal prosecutor whose theory of
the case was that Linehan was a hardened, remorseless criminal.
Part of the State's case was devoted to showing that Linehan
had apparently engaged in prior planning of his sexual offenses,
and had not acted impulsively. This was hardly a theory
designed to demonstrate an "utter lac;:k of power to control."
The prosecutor's trial theory initially proved successful, and the
trial court committed Linehan. The initial order committing
Linehan contained no reference to the Pearson standard; the
final order mentioned the standard in only a conclusory fashion.
Id. at 614. The Minnesota Court of Appeals affirmed. Linehan,
503 N.W.2d 142. The commitment was reversed by the
Minnesota Supreme Court precisely because the State had not
proved the "utter lack of power to control" element. See
Linehan I, 518 N.W.2d at 619; see also Blakey, supra note 62,
at 259-64.

135 See, e.g., Salerno, 481 U.S. 739. This case gave strong
hope to proponents of a '1urisprudence of prevention" that
would allow preventive detention based on dangerousness

138 See, e.g., In re Fitzpatrick, No. C6-94-255, 1994 WL
164218 (Minn. Ct. App. May 3, 1994); In re Sadiki, No. C4-932317, 1994 WL 111336 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 5, 1994); In re
Buckbalton, No. C2-93-1446, 1994 WL 43870 (Minn. Ct.
App. Feb. 15, 1994); In re Rickmyer, No. CX-93 1446, 1993
WL 480177 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 1993); In re Benson, No.
CO-93-1357, 1993 WL 459840 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 9, 1993);
In re Sabo, No. C6-93-1329, 1993 WL 366718 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept. 21, 1993); In re Sadiki, No. C3-93-1045, 1993 WL
355906 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 1993).
139 Through this period of time, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals reversed two sex offender commitments. In re
Rodriguez, 506 N.W.2d 660 (Minn. ct. App. 1993); In re
Stilinovich, 479 N.W.2d 731 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992). In both,
the basis for reversal was that the individual posed a type of
harm that was outside of the scope of the state's sex offender
commitment law.
The "utter lack of power to control" test was the basis for
several trial court decisions dismissing sex offender
commitment petitions. In In re Kotowski, No. P5-93-0037
(Dist. Ct., Ramsey County, Minn. Sept. 3, 1993), the trial court
denied a petition to commit on the grounds that the "utter lack
of power to control" standard had not been proved. The court
cited with approval the testimony of one psychologist who
testified that Kotowski "is able to choose whether or not to act
in a particular manner. He has a conscious ability to control
himself." The court concluded: "If society needs protection
from his behavior, he should be in prison ifhe commits criminal
acts."
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See also In re Greene, No. P8-92-13161 (Dist. Ct., Anoka
County, Minn. July 8, 1993) (Pearson standard requires (1)
"high threshold regarding frequency and type of sexual
misconduct and markedly deficient controls"; and (2) a "lack of
habitual and repeated misconduct" in the respondent).

supra note 146; Kuebelbeck, supra note 145; Whereatt, supra

140 See In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 920 (Wahl, 1.,
dissenting) ("It is troubling that since the Minnesota statute
went into effect in 1939, it has been arbitrarily and
inconsistently enforced despite the limiting construction in
Pearson.").

150 Id.

note 145.

149 Hearings, supra note 54, at 1 (testimony of Attorney
General Humphrey).

151

See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 23-24.

152 See Gustafson & Whereatt, supra note 146, at lA; Lisa G.
Lednicer & Tim Nelson, Linehan Release, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PREss, Aug. 16, 1994, at lA.

141 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915 ("The fact that the
statute has been misapplied on occasion is not a valid criticism
of the statute itself. The remedy for misapplication is not to
declare the statute unconstitutional but to appeal erroneous
decisions and get them reversed. More pertinent to the facial
challenge to the statute are the cases where the statute has been
properly applied.") (footnotes omitted).

153 Conrad deFiebre, Linehan Recommitment Trial Ends,Judge to Rule in May, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., Mar. 3, 1995,
at IB; Conrad deFiebre, Violation Ruled Insufficient for
Linehan Imprisonment, MINNEAPOLIS STAR-TRIB., June 1, 1995,

This exchange was foreshadowed by Sas, 334 F.2d at 514,
516 (noting that the statute was "carefully drawn to conform to
the [Pearson] definition," and therefore not facially
unconstitutional, but "may be fraught with the possibility of
abuse in that if not administered in the spirit in which it is
conceived it can become a mere device for warehousing the
obnoxious and antisocial elements of society").

154 See Mimi Hall, A Furor Brews Over Release of Sex
Offenders, USA TODAY, Aug. 17, 1994, at 3A; Molesters
Reassigned Amid Furor,
Minnesota
Court
Limits
Hospitalization of Sex Offenders, CmcAGO TRIB., Aug. 17,
1994, at 16; Neighbors Angry as Sex Killer Secretly Enters
Halfway House, ARIz. REpUBLIC, Aug. 17, 1994, at A3; Sex
Offender's Release Has Minn. Governor Scurrying to Tighten
Law, CHARLESTON GAZETTE, Aug. 17, 1994, at lOA.

142 518 N.W.2d 609. On the same day, the court also
reversed the commitment of Rickmyer. In re Rickmyer, 519
N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1994). The court held that the conduct of
Rickmyer, who was a non-violent pedophile, did not meet the
dangerousness threshold for a sex offender commitment. Id. at
190.
143 MSH Fax, supra note 128 (indicating 371 individuals
"admitted" to state hospital under psychopathic personality
law); deFiebre, supra note 131 (indicating that 314 persons
were committed during the same time period).

144 See Linehan I, 518 N. W.2d at 610.
145 See, e.g., Paul Gustafson & Robert Whereatt,
Rapist/Murderer Wins Release - And Tight Surveillance, MINN.
STAR-TRIB., Aug. 16, 1994, at lA; Donna Halvorsen, Task
Force Agrees on Bill to Control Sexual Predators, MINN. STARTRIB., Aug. 20, 1994, at lA; Amy Kuebelbeck, House Speaker
Wants Special Session to Avert Freeing Sexual Predators, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PRESS, July 9, 1994, at 3E; Robert Whereatt,

Laws Proposed to Keep Sex Predators Off Streets, MINN. STAR-

at 2B.

155 Good Morning America (CBS television broadcast, Aug.
23, 1994).
156

1994 Minn. Laws, 1st. Spec. Sess., ch. 1.

157 See Minn. Stat. Ann. § 253B.02, subd. 18b ("[I]t is not
necessary [for purposes of the SDP Act] to prove that the person
has an inability to control the person's sexual impulses.")
158 See Hearings, supra note 54, at 3 (testimony of Attorney
General Humphrey) ("One of our concerns is that any new
statute we come up with may be subject to a constitutional
challenge. No matter how carefully we design this statute, we
can never be sure that the courts will uphold its validity.").
159 See Our Perspective: Linehan's Lament, MINN. STARTRIB., Aug. 30, 1994, at 8A (supporting new law); New Law
Endangers Constitutional Rights, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, Jan.
18, 1995, at 8A (opposing new law); Loophole-Closing a
Mistake, DULUTIINEWS-TRIB., Sept. 2, 1994, at 7A (opposing).
160 See Kirwin, supra note 3, at 25.

TRIB., Aug. 12, 1994, at lA.

146 Panel Blasts Court Decision to Free Sex Offenders, MINN.
STAR-TRIB., July 15, 1994, at 5B (quoting Rep. Dave Bishop,
R-Rochester, Minn.).
147

1994 Minn. Laws ch. 636, art. 8, § 20.

148 See Panel Blasts Court Decision to Free Sex Offenders,
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161 House of Representatives, State of Minnesota, Special
Session of the Seventy-Eighth Legislature, 7 JOURNAL OF THE
HOUSE OF REpRESENTATIVES 8821, 8823 (1994); Senate, State of
Minnesota, Special Session of the Seventy-Eighth Legislature, 5
JOURNAL OF THE SENATE 1, 8 (1994).

162 See Donna Halvorsen & Robert Whereatt, Sexual
Predator Bill Ok'd, MINN. STAR-TRIB., Sept. 1, 1994, at lA.
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163 After five weeks of trial, the district court committed
Linehan as a Sexually Dangerous Person. In re Linehan, No.
P8-94-0382 (Dist Ct., Ramsey County, Minn. 1995). Linehan
appealed. His commitment was affirmed by the Minnesota
Court of Appeals. In re Linehan, 544 N.W.2d 308, 313
[Linehan 11]. In December 1996, the Minnesota Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that the SDP Act is constitutional as applied
to Linehan. In re Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 167 (Minn. 1996); 557
N.W.2d 171 (Minn. 1996).
164 See Stephen J. Huot, Screening and Reforral by the
Department of Corrections, in PSYCHOPATffiC PERSONALITIES
AND SEXUALLY DANGEROUS PERSONS (1995).
165 See Donald J. Giese, Iversen Slay Suspect Named, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PREss, July 29, 1965, at AI; Donald J. Giese,
Linehan Signs Statement, ST. PAUL PIONEER PREss, July 30,
1965, at AI; Donald J. Giese, Linehan Confosses Slaying, ST.
PAUL PIONEER PREss, July 31,1965, at AI.
166 See Morse, supra note 82, at 166, where it is observed
that:

No consensus about involuntariness exists among
"experts" or laypeople. Although many forensic
psychiatrists and psychologists (and lawyers)
assume that they possess a good account of
involuntariness and of so-called pathologies of the
will and volition, no satisfactory and surely no
uncontroversial account of any of these topics exists
in the psychiatric, psychological, philosophical, or
legal literatures.
167 In re Crocker, No. CO-95-2500, 1996 WL 192974 (Minn.
Ct. App. Apr. 23, 1996); Call v. Gomez, No. C6-95-2470, 1996
WL 162466 (Minn. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 1996); In re Mattson, No.
C8-95-2423, 1996 WL 167638 (Minn. Ct. App Apr. 9, 1996);
In re Edstrom, No. C2-95-2448, 1996 WL 132141 (Minn. Ct.
App. Mar. 26,1996); In re Mentzos, No. C3-95-2331, 1996 WL
81721 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 27, 1996); In re Hart, No. C9-952057, 1996 WL 56504 (Minn. Ct. App. Feb. 9, 1996); Kruger v.
Comm'r of Human Servs., No. C4-95-1866, 1996 WL 5786
(Minn. Ct App. Jan. 9, 1996); In re Kunshier, No. C7-95-1490,
1995 WL 687692 (Minn. Ct App. Nov. 21, 1995); In re
Patterson, No. C3-95-935, 1995 WL 550098 (Minn. Ct. App.
Sept 19, 1995); In re Adolphson, No. 1995 WL 434386 (Minn.
Ct. App. July 25, 1995); In re Mattson, No. C5-95-452, 1995
WL 365374 (Minn. Ct. App. June 20, 1995); In re Pirkl, 531
N.W.2d 902 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re Sadiki, No. C7-95419, 1995 WL 311799 (Minn. Ct. App. May 23, 1995); In re
Toulou, No. CO-94-2518, 1995 WL 265071 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 9, 1995); In re Mayfield, No. C2-95-103, 1995 WL
254407 (Minn. Ct. App. May 2, 1995); In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d
366 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995); In re Young, No. CI-94-1779, 1994
WL 654508 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 1994); In re Patterson,
No. CO-94-1367, 1994 WL 615035 (Minn. Ct App. Nov. 8,
1994); In re Mayfield, No. C8-94-1407, 1994 WL 593885
(Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1994); In re Toulou, No. C9-94-993,
1994 WL 593907 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 1994); In re

Fitzpatrick, No. CI-94-1409, 1994 WL 586962 (Minn. Ct. App.
Oct. 25, 1994); In re Kunshier, 521 N.W.2d 880 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d 525 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d 446 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1994); In re Holly, No. C9-94-492, 1994 WL 396314
(Minn. Ct App. Aug. 2,1994).
168 In In re Blodgett the Minnesota Supreme Court set forth
factors that courts should use in evaluating the "utter lack of
power to control" standard:
In applying the Pearson test, the court considers the
nature and frequency of the sexual assaults, the
degree of violence involved, the relationship (or
lack thereof) between the offender and the victims,
the offender's attitude and mood, the offender'S
medical and family history, the results of
psychological and psychiatric testing and
evaluation, and such other factors that bear on the
predatory sex impulse and the lack of power to
control it.
510 N.W.2d at 915. But these factors, though they may well be
relevant, give no instruction about how to distinguish lack of
capacity to control from failure to control. See SCHOPP, supra
note 71, at 188 (criticizing Blodgett factors as being irrelevant to
volitional dysfunction).
169 See In re Blodgett, 490 N.W.2d at 642-46.
170 See In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530 (affirming
commitment although "the [pedophilic] 'grooming' process
requires time, thus eliminating any 'suddenness' regarding the
sexual activity"); In re Mayfield, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602,
at *8 (approving of expert testimony "explaining how planning
could occur even when the person had an utter lack of control
over his sexual impulses"); In re Young, 1994 Minn. App.
LEXIS 1159, at *6 ("[W]hile Young may show planning and
premeditation by his grooming behavior, his behavior is
nonetheless impulsive and without volitional control.").

171 In In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d at 375, the court approved of
testimony indicating that:
[A]n important factor in determining whether one
has power to control sexual impulses is whether the
person feels he has a problem; if so, he at least has
some control since he knows he is flawed, and may
be more vigilant in seeking assistance. . .. Without
this basic insight, appellant has the utter lack of
control required by Pearson.
See also In re Fitzpatrick, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1029, at *3
(Fitzpatrick "habitually shifts blame for his actions to others ...
[and] fails to appreciate the consequences of his actions"); In re
Adolphson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 965, at *10 ("Appellant's
actions show he has no will to stop sexually assaulting
adolescent males. Although appellant is aware that his conduct
is against the law, he shows no remorse and expresses no second
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thoughts.")
172 In re Toulou, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1067, at *9.

173 See In re Holly, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 715, at *5
(noting that "[e]ven while at the security hospital, [Holly] has
'mooned' a female staff person . . . and made inappropriate
sexual comments to another female staff person," and
concluding that Holly could not control his sexual impulses).
174 See In re Toulou, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 623, at *7
(citing trial court finding "that Toulou is 'totally dependent on
external forces to conform to society's mores,' and that a
'removal of those external controls, however, will predictably
result in [Toulou] acting on his impulses."').
175 In re Kunshier, 521 N.W.2d at 882 (reciting expert
testimony that "[Kunshier's] impulse to rape becomes all
intrusive[,]" and that his "behavior was usually 'impulse driven
past any point of rational control or concern regarding negative
impact upon victims or the risk of incarceration. "')
176 In re Adolphson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 965.
177 Id. at * 10 ("Appellant's actions show he has no will to
stop sexually assaulting adolescent males."); In re Holly, 1994
Minn. App. LEXIS 715, at *5 ("continued preoccupation with
sexual gratification and his constant desire to attain this
gratification at whatever cost").

178 In re Mattson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 805, at *6
("[W]hen a person engages in behavior despite repeated
consequences, it evidences a lack of control").
179 In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d at 450 (distinguishing
"plotting, planning, seductions, payments, and coercive
behavior ... from [an] impulsive lack of control").
180 In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530; In re Mayfield,
1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, at *8; In re Young, 1994 Minn.
App. LEXIS 1159, at *6.
181 No. C3-95-2331, 1996 WL 81721 at *5 (Minn. Ct. App.
Feb. 27, 1996).

182 In re Blodgett, 510 N.W.2d at 915.
183 In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 540 (1968) (concurring
opinion), Justice Black said:
When we say that appellant's [conduct] is caused
not by "his own" volition but rather by some other
force, we are clearly thinking of a force that is
nevertheless "his" except in some special sense.
The accused undoubtedly commits the proscribed
act and the only question is whether the act can be
attributed to a part of "his" personality that should
not be regarded as criminally responsible.
184 MILLON, supra note 30, at 181-215.
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185 Compare this description with that given by Gene G. Abel
& Joanne L. Rouleau, The Nature and Extent of Sexual Assault,
in HANDBOOK OF SEXUAL ASSAULT 9, 18 (William L. Marshall
et al. eds., 1990):
[M]any individuals report having recurrent,
repetitive, and compulsive urges and fantasies to
commit rapes. These offenders attempt to control
their urges, but the urges eventually become so
strong that they act upon them, commit rapes, and
then feel guilty afterwards with a temporary
reduction of urges, only to have the cycle repeat
again.

186 See Morse, supra note 82, at 170-74 (arguing that
volitional impairment arises where the individual suffers a
"desire or craving ... so intense that the fear of the pain of not
satisfying it was the true motive for offending").
187 Schopp writes that volition is "an exercise of the faculty
or function by which one engages in conscious and intentional
action as a result of decision or choice through deliberation. A
volitional impairment would involve some disorder of the
capacities by which one engages in conscious and intentional
action in response to deliberation and choice." SCHOPP, supra
note 71, at 202 (claiming that "severe cognitive
psychopathology" is the basis for volitional impairment).

188 See Morse, supra note 82, at 177 (asserting that the
cognitive/rationality functions are more easily assessed than the
"strength of another's desires and dysphoria or fear ofit. ").
189 See, e.g., Halleck, supra note 71, at 338-53; Seymour L.
Halleck et a\., The Use of Psychiatric Diagnoses in the Legal
Process: Task Force Report to the American Psychiatric
Association, 20 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 481, 494
(1992); cf Morse, supra note 82, at 177.
190 See Morse, supra note 82, at 177; Halleck, supra note 71,
at 338-53 (discussing the setting of threshold levels).
191 In re Schweninger, 520 N.W.2d at 450.
192 Lawrence Z. Freedman, Psychoanalysis, Delinquency, and
the Law, in By REASON OF INSANITY 81, 85 (Lawrence Z.
Freedman ed., 1983).

193 See Gary Watson, Free Agency, 72 J. PHIL. 205, 217-19
(1975) (drawing distinction between the "lower" desires, drives,
and impulses, and the "higher" faculties of rationality,
deliberation, and planning).
194 521 N.W.2d 880 (remanded for further findings on the
issue of "utter lack of power to control").

195Id. at 882.
196 In re Hart, 1996 WL 56504, at *7.
197 In re Bieganowski, 520 N.W.2d at 530; In re Mayfield,
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1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, at *8.

(1995)).

198 Thus, the following passage from the opinion:

206 DANIEL C. DENNEIT, ELBOW ROOM: THE VARIETIES OF
FREEWILL WORllIWANTING 133 (1983).

[A]n important factor in determining whether one
has power to control sexual impulses is whether the
person feels he has a problem; if so, he at least has
some control since he knows he is flawed, and may
be more vigilant in seeking assistance.... Without
this basic insight, appellant has the utter lack of
control required by Pearson.

In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d at 375; see also In re Adolphson, 1995
Minn. App. LEXIS 965.
There is no suggestion in either Adolphson or Irwin that the
beliefs or desires were so irrational, as opposed to illegal and
immoral, that they would satisfy a cognitive based theory of
criminal irresponsibility. See Morse, supra note 82.

199 See MaLON, supra note 30, at 11.
200 In re Irwin, 529 N.W.2d at 375; In re Adolphson, 1995
Minn. App. LEXIS 965.
201 See Morse, supra note 82, at 175 ("We are all in large
measure the product of biological endowments and
environments over which we had no control, and many of our
central desires are firmly established well before we reach the
age of genuine, independent moral reflection on those desires.").
202 Charles M. Culver & Bernard Gert, Volitional
Disabilities, in PmLOSOPHY oFMEorcINE 111, 119 (1982).
203 Halleck et aI., supra note 189, at 495.

207 Similarly, in In re Sabo, 1993 Minn. App. LEXIS 947, at
*3, Sabo "received numerous discipline violations for drug use
and smuggling, verbal abuse, and threatening others," which
supported a finding that he was unable to control his sexual
impulses. See also In re Holly, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 715, at
*5; In re Mattson," 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 805, at *6 (citing
with approval expert testimony that "utter lack of control was
demonstrated by the fact that even when appellant was in a
structured setting, he had difficulty refraining from the use of
pornography"); In re Fitzpatrick, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS
1029, at *4 (lack of control demonstrated by "recent
inappropriate behavior while incarcerated"); In re Patterson,
1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1199, at *8 (offenses committed
"despite negative consequences" also supports a finding of
"utter lack of power to control").

208 In re Kunshier, 1995 WL 687692, at *3.
209 More specifically:
The trial court cited testimony that Toulou was like
a wild, predatory animal, which will strike when it
is hungry and when prey is available unless deterred
by other larger predators. The court found that
Toulou is "totally dependent on external forces to
conform to society's mores," and that a "removal of
those external controls, however, will predictably
result in [Toulou] acting on his impulses."

In re Toulou, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 623, at *7.

This is a variant of the "policeman-at-the-elbow" test for an
"irresistible impulse." See Lawrence Z. Freedman, -Psychiatry
and the Law: An Overview, in By REASON OF INSANITY, supra
note 192, at 117, 126 (criticizing the test and quoting an Ontario
judge: "We shall dangle a rope in front of you and see whether
your impulses are irresistible ....").
204 As Morse, supra note 82, at 179, observes:
Those who offend in the face of certain capture have
either rationally decided for political or other
reasons that the offense is worth the punishment, as
in cases of civil disobedience, or they are irrational.
We generally tend to conclude that intense internal
coercion was operative if conduct was so irrational
that we can't make any sense of it; otherwise, why
would the person do it?

205 See Pratt, supra note 126, at 34 ("'The dangerous' have
always found themselves in a juridical position between the
sane and the insane; not sane enough to stop breaking the law,
not insane enough to satisfy the legal requirements for this
defense.") (quoting John Pratt, Dangerousness. Risk and
Technologies of Power, 28 AUSlL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 1

210 In re Mayfield, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 602, at *4-5
(emphasis added).
211 In re Young, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1159, at *6
(emphasis added).

212 In re Patterson, 1994 Minn. App. LEXIS 1094, at *6
(emphasis added).
213 In re Patterson, 1995 Minn. App. LEXIS 1199, at *8

(emphasis added).

214 In re Biegenowski, 520 N.W.2d at 527 (emphasis added).
215 See Morse, supra note 82, at 178 (criticizing R. Rogers,
APA's Position on the Insanity Defense: Empiricism versus
Emotionalism, 42 AM. PSYCHOL. 840 (1987), for "beg[ging] the
question" by defining an assessment of volitional capacity in
terms of "loss of control").
216 See Morse, supra note 82, at 177 ("[F]amously, we cannot
distinguish between irresistible impulses and those impulses
simply not resisted.").
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217 See Young v. Weston, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS; In re
Hendricks, 912 P.2d 129.

218 This was the path advocated by the State of Louisiana in
Foucha v. Louisiana. See Brief of Respondent at 9-12, Foucha
v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992) (No. 90-5844). It was rejected
by the Supreme Court. See Janus, supra note 79, at 170-77.
219 See ARGYRlS & SCHON, supra note 40, at xiii, ix (espoused
theories are those explanations to which the agent gives its
allegiance).
220 Id. at 80.
221 Id. at 81.

222 "The chief asset of the legal system is its legitimacy."
Charles Kester, The Language of Law, the Sociology of Science
and the Troubles of Translation Defining the Proper Role for
Scientific Evidence of Causation, 74 NEB. L. REv. 529, 563
(1995) (citing JESSE H. CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE
NATIONAL
POLmCAL
PROCESS:
A
FUNCTIONAL
RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT 56,
129-70 (1980».
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